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I. Introduction
Ours is the information age.' No longer do we strive for power through
production. Instead, we garner economic advantage through the information
we control and disseminate.2 Technology has made this paradigm shift pos-
sible? However, with change come problems. For example, electronic mail
(e-mail)4 has begun to create unexpected difficulties for private network
providers.' The primary question has become who may control the informa-
tional content on a network and how they may do so. In other words, we must
ask whether and how the law can protect the private network providers'
interest in restricting access to the flow of information on its network.
One corporation's attemptto controlthe informationflowingto its network
from outside sources has given rise to a legal battle.6 In December 1996, em-
ployees of computer chip giant Intel Corporation (ntel) 7 received e-mail from
a group named FACE Intel.! FACE Intel, founded by Ken Hamidi, is a group of
1. SeeANNEV hWESBRANSCOMBWH OWNS INFORMATION? FROMPRIVACYTOPUBLIC
AccEss 1-8 (1994) (discussing development of economic base in information and growing
recognition of need to answer what it means to be in information age); Susan E. Gindin, Lost
and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in theAge of the Internet, 34 SANDIEGO L.
REV. 1153, 1162-63 (1997) (stating that society has entered information age as result of
transformation of economic base from industry to information).
2. See BRANsCOMB, supra note 1, at 3-4 (stating that transactions in information occur
whenever someone believes he or she will profit from sale of such information); see also John
0. McCinnis, The Once and Future Propery-Based Vision of the FirstAmendment, 63 U. CHL
L. REV. 49, 102 (1996) (referencing value of information and growth of Internet); Michael L
Meyerson, Virtual Constitutions: The Creation of Rules for Governing Private Networks, 8
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 129, 149 (1994) (observing that private information has economic value).
3. See BRANSCOMB, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that explosion in information trafficking
has resulted from technological revolutions that make gathering, organizing, and transmitting
information faster and easier).
4. See Wendy R. Leibowitz, E-mailAbuses Abound, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1999, at 10,
10 (commenting that e-mail will be most ubiquitous source of trouble for business owners).
5. In this Note, the term "private network provider(s)" refers to private entities such as
employers and some universities. To refer to companies whose business is providing Internet
connection services, this Note uses the term "Internet service provider" or ISP.
6. Please note that all sources related to ease documentation inlntelv. Hamidi are available
atIntelv. Hamidi (visited Jan. 14, 2000) <http'lwww.Intelhamidi.com/casedocuments.htm>.
7. See Walter Isaacson, Man of the Year: The Microchip Is the Dynamo of a New
Economy... Driven by the Passion oflntel'sAndrew Grove, TIME, Dec. 29, 1997, at 52, 52
(explaining that Intel is private company that produces nearly 90% of world's microprocessors).
8. See Intel's Memorandum of Points and Authorities for Intel's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 1, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, No. 98AS05067 (Sacramento Super. Ct. filed
Dec. 9, 1998) [hereinafter Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment] (explaining that Intel had
received large number of e-mail from FACE Intel), available at <http'/Aww.Intelhamidi.com/
summar3yudgmenthtm>; see also FACE Intel (visited Jan. 14, 2000) <http'//www.faceintel.
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former Intel employees who have banded together for the purpose of protesting
Intel's personnel policies." FACE Intel spreads its message of opposition by
maintaining a World Wide Web (Web) site and, formerly, by sending unsolic-
ited bulk e-mail to current Intel employees." Intel has not challenged the
existence of the Web site, but it did decide it would no longer tolerate the e-mail
that FACE Intel and Hamidi were sending over the Intel computer network.'
In early 1998, a wave of e-mail from FACE Intel caught Intel's atten-
tion. 2 Intel responded by asking Hamidi and FACE Intel to cease and desist
from sending any additional e-mail over the Intel computer network, including
the company e-mail system.' Despite Intel's demand, Hamidi sent another
bulk e-mail in September 1998."4
Hamidi's refusal to comply with Intel's request ultimately led Intel to file
a complaint, based on trespass to chattels and nuisance theories, in Sacm-
mento, California Superior Court in early October 1998.' Intel named both
Hamidi and FACE Intel as defendants.' 6 The superior court responded favor-
ably to Intel's complaint and issued a preliminary injunction that prohibited
Hamidi from sending any further e-mail to Intel employees over Intel's com-
puter nework. 17 In June 1999, the court granted summary judgment and made
the temporary injunction permanent.'
8
comlwhoweare.htm> (explaining acronym, purpose of group, and setting forth FACE Intel's
grievances against company)
9. SeeFACE Inel (visited Jan. 14,2000) <http'l/www.faceintel.con> (explaining FACE
Intel's purpose); see also Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 1 (stating
FACE Intel's purpose). Intel has sued for an injunction against Hamidi personally as well as
against FACE Intel as a group. Complaint, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, No. 98AS05067 (Sacramento
Super. Ct. filed Oct. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Complaint], available at <httpi/AvwwJntelhamidi.
com/intelawsuithtm>.
10. Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment supra note 8, at 1.
11. See generally Complaint, supra note 9 (seeking to enjoin Hamidi's use of Intel com-
puter network to send e-mail to Intel employees).
12. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 1 (explaining when Intel
decided to take action in response to Hamidi's e-mail).
13. Id. at2.
14. Id atl.
15. See Complaint, supra note 9, at 4-12, 14-15 (stating that Intel seeks recovery under
trespass to chattels and nuisance theories).
16. See id. (naming Hamidi and FACE Intel as defendants).
17. See Preliminary Injunction, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, No. 98AS05067 (Sacramento
Super. Ct. issued Nov. 24, 1998) [hereinafter Preliminary Injunction] (granting preliminary
injunction until final judgment after trial on merits), available at <http'/www.intelhamidi.com/
injunctionproposal.htm>.
18. See Order for Entry of Final Judgment, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, No. 98AS05067
(Sacramento Super Ct. June 16, 1999) (stating that court issued injunction in favor of Intel on
June 16, 1999), available at <http'/Iwww.intelhamidi.com/permanentinjunction.htm>.
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 209 (2000)
As a private company, Intel uses its private e-mail system and computer
network to provide its employees with e-mail and Internet access, but it does
not provide Internet access to any outside parties. 9 Through its lawsuit against
Hamidi, Intel sought to protect its interests in its proprietary e-mail system and
computer network.2 0 To persuade the court to protect Intel's interests, Intel
argued that intrusions into its proprietary computer system constitute atrespass
to chattels under California law.21 Intel based its theory on cases in which
Internet service providers (ISPs) have successfully argued that unsolicited bulk
e-mail constitutes atrespass to chattels, namelythe ISPs' computer networks.'
This Note argues that it is incorrect to apply the trespass to chattels theory
to cases in which private network providers, specifically employers, seek to
protect their interests in their computer networks.' Trespass to chattels
requires that a plaintiff demonstrate tangible harm.24 It is more difficult for
private network providers than for ISPs to meet this requirement.' This Note
proposes that analogizing trespasses to a private network and trespass to land
provides more adequate protection to the private network provider's interest
in controlling the information and activities on the provider's network.26 In
trespass to real property, the plaintiff must show only that the defendant was
on the plaintiff's property without permission. Under the standard proposed
in this Note, the plaintiff private network provider could prevail by showing
that the defendant had continued to send e-mail to the plaintiff's network
despite notice that the defendant no longer had permission to do so. This
standard would allow the provider to protect its network without needing to
19. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 3 (stating that Intel's e-
mail system is for Intel corporate use only and stating that Intel has written policies for em-
ployee use of e-mail system). Intel's policy states that employees may use the network for
business and for limited personal purposes. See id.
20. See Complaint, supra note 9, at 6, 9-10 (stating that Intel is protecting private
computer network).
21. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 3 (describing Intel's
trespass to chattels argument).
22. See infra Part IV (discussing development of trespass to chattels as applied to elec-
tronic trespasses and ISPs). See generally America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548
(E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that advertiser's unsolicited bulk e-mail to ISP's customers over ISP's
network constituted trespass to chattels); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F.
Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (same).
23. See infra Part V.B-C (arguing that trespass to chattels does not adequately protect
private network provider's interest in controlling information flowing to its network).
24. RE sTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 218 cmt. e (1965); see also infra Part IV.B
(setting forth requirements for trespass to chattels).
25. See infra Part V.3 (comparing trespass to chattels in cases involving ISPs and private
network providers).
26. See infra Part V.C (arguing that trespass to real property analogy will provide greater
protection to interests of private network provider).
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show tangible harm but would limit the relief to those instances in which the
defendant had actual notice that it no longer had the privilege of sending e-mail
on the private provider's network.
Part II ofthis Note provides thetechnical background necessary for under-
standing the analysis. First, Part ll.A briefly describes the Internet's develop-
ment.Y Parts ll.B and II.C then differentiate between the Web and e-mail as
discrete subsets of Internet communication.' To provide a paradigm for the
analysis of e-mail issues, Part 1H discusses how the courts and the commenta-
tors thus far have approached broader Internet-related issues.29 Part IV dis-
cusses attempts by commercial ISPs to control e-mail messages that advertisers
send over the ISPs' networks using the trespass to chattels theory.3" Part V.A
ofthis Note fully develops the facts ofthe Intel case." Part V.B analyzes why
the trespass to chattels cause of action is not the appropriate theory for protect-
ing private network providers' interests in their private property.32 Part V.C
concludes that analogizingtrespasses to private networks and trespasses to land
can better protect the interests of the private network provider.33
ff. Technical Background
The Internet provides a large number of people with access to an ex-
tremely varied supply of information.34 Necessarily, the methods for using
Internet resources and for conmunicating on the Internet are not all the same.
For example, e-mail allows users to deliver specific information to specific
recipients while the Web allows users to "post" information for other users to
find according to their interests.3" Distinguishing between communications
27. See Part I.A (describing development of Internet).
28. See infra Part ]ILB-C (discussing accessing Internet and modes of communication on
Internet).
29. See infra Part TIT (discussing court and commentator approaches to Internet-related
issues).
30. See infra Part IV (discussing current state of law with respect to ISPs' attempts to
control unsolicited bulk e-mail from unauthorized sources).
31. See infra Part V.A (setting forth facts ofIntel case).
32. See infra Part V.3 (distinguishing Intel from ISP cases).
33. See infra Part V.C (arguing that real property notions will more adequately protect
private network providers' interests).
34. See Bob Norberg, Price Right for Web E-mail, but Ads Part of Deal, THE PRESS
DEMOCRAT, Sept. 7,1998, at D1 (stating that one e-mail provider, Hotmail, has 22 million users
and is growing at rate of 100,000 subscribers per day); Global Internet Statistics, (visited Jan.
14, 2000) <http'//www.glreach.comglobstats/> (stating that approximately 243 million people
world-wide have access to Internet today and that by end of year 2000 projected 327 million
people will have access).
35. See infra Part I.C (describing ways to utilize information on Internet); infra note 66
(explaining publishing on Web pages).
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV 209 (2000)
on the Internet may help explain why an employer will have a greater interest
in prohibiting or limiting e-mail that flows to and over its system, while at the
same time the employer may have little or no concern for controlling the con-
tent of others' Web postings. 6
A. Development of the Internet
In simplest terms, the Internet is a "network of networks."37 A basic
network is a group of interconnected computers that exchange files and
messages and that often share equipment such as printers." The innumerable
connections among smaller networks of linked computers create the giant net-
work called the Internet.39 Given the breadth of the Intemet, its development
is both complex and complicated. The Internet originated from projects in
computer networking connecting multiple computers in order to share and to
transmit information40 By the early 1980s, this growing network reliably
36. SeeDevelopments in theLaw-TheLaw ofCyberspace: InternetRegulation Through
ArchitecturalModification: The PropertyRule Structure of Code Solutions, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1574, 1649-56 (1999) (discussing competing issues of access to material available on Internet
and exclusion of access through copyright protection). The development note observes that the
Internet has made otherwise protected materials freely available and thus compromised the
promise of copyright. Id. at 1650. The note cautions that this availability may hamper the
growth of the Internet as individuals limit what material they place on the Internet in their effort
to protect their interest in their own product Id.
37. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-49 (E.D. Pa. 1996) [hereinafter ACLU 1]
(explaining factual background of Internet and related available technologies). Pundits and
commentators use a variety of metaphors to refer to the phenomenon know as the Internet See
Robert C. Cumbow, Cyberspace Must Exceed Its Grasp, or What's a Metaphor? Tropes, Trips
and Stumbles on the Info Highway, 20 SEATiLE U.L. REV. 664,667-68 (1997) (observing many
different metaphors for Internet); Kent N. Schneider & Timothy P. Hedley, The World Wide
Web: A Promising Tool for Legal Research, 52 . Mo. B. 301, 303 (1996) (describing web
metaphor for Internet as apt). For an esoteric description of the "net" metaphor, see KEVIN
KELLY, OUT OF CONTROL, 25-26 (1994).
38. SeeACLUI, 929 F. Supp. at 830-31 (explaining computer networks).
39. See id. (explaining how links among multiple computer networks create Internet).
Internal networks, or "intranets" also exist Intranets are networks internal to an organization,
and they do not provide access to the Internet Id.
40. See DOUGLASE. COMER, THEINThMMETBOOK49-53 (1995) (explaining early devel-
opments in Internet technology). See generally id. (explaining Internet in lay person's terms).
After researchers succeeded in connecting nearby computers through local area network (LAN)
technology, they began efforts to expand connections in order to transfer, irrespective of dis-
tance, data among computers. See id. at 49-53 (discussing LAN technology and increasing
availability of Wide Area Networks (WANs) to connect computers located long distances from
one another and elaborating on desirability of single network that would permit data transfer and
information access among local and long distance computers). Several private companies then
formed a nonprofit company to build a new WAN across the nation in an effort to expand the
growing network. See id. (explaining development of current Internet by private companies);
see also Henry H. Perrit, Jr., What Is The Internet?, 443 PLI/PAT. 11, 13 (1996) (commenting
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connected a limited number of research facilities and university academic
fhcilities across the country and world." The network known as the Internet
came into existence and continues to function because numerous institutions,
companies, and individuals have agreed and have chosen to utilize common
software protocols for computer communication. 2
Two developments in Internet software proved particularly important for
connecting large numbers of computers across long distances: Internet Proto-
col (IP) software and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) software. IP
software provides the basic communication capacity without which a com-
puter cannot use the Internet. 3 TCP software provides an organizational
framework for the information that the IP software transmits.' The primary
advantage of the TCP/IP design is that it accommodates differences in com-
puters, networks, and available services which in turn allows large numbers
of computers to communicate. 4 This flexibility inthe TCP/IP software allows
computer users to meet their own computing needs on a local level while also
connecting to the information resources of the Internet.46
that funding for Internet has shifted from government subsidy to private funding). Perritt also
makes the paint that no single entity "owns" the Internet. Id.; seeACLUI, 929 F. Supp. at 831-
32 (discussing administration and ownership of computers using Internet for communication).
41. See COMER, supra note 40, at 63 (stating that Internet worked reliably to interconnect
academic and research facilities).
42. See ACLUI, 929 F. Supp. at 832 (stating that Internet exists and functions because
various entities have independently decided to use same data transfer protocols).
43. See COMER, supra note 40, at 107-14 (explaining that Internet Protocol software is
necessary for sending and receiving any information on Internet). The term "protocol" refers
to the agreement to use a common computer language so that two computers can exchange
information. Id. at 107.
44. See id. at 115-20 (explaining that TCP software makes reliable communication possi-
ble by ordering packets of information sent on Internet by IP software). TCP/IP software helped
to resolve the problems that arose from the incompatibility among various computers and
networks by providing a common application package that permits vastly different computers
and computer networks to exchange information. See id. at 98 (explaining how TCP/IP
software helps solve problem of incompatibility of networks and computers); see also id. at 86
(stating that Internet offers many services but that primary advantage of Internet is design of
TCP/IP software that accommodates changes in computers, networks, and available services).
By using the TCP/IP standards, very different computers can connect with each other, thus
allowing large numbers of computer users to communicate. See Perritt, supra note 40, at 13-14
(discussing unique features of Internet as part of national information infrastructure). Perritt
explains that the TCP/IP protocol permits computers that do not use the same hardware (for
example, an IBM or Toshiba computer) or software (for example, Microsoft Windows or DOS)
to transmit data between one another. Id.
45. See COMER, supra note 40, at 86 (explaining that TCP/IP software allows entities with
different computers to communicate).
46. See id. (commenting upon difficulty of forcing all computer users to use same com-
puter resources when each entity often has its own computing needs). However, given the
recent charges against Microsoft that allege violation of the antitrust laws in the distribution of
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Computer networking occurs when software programs in separate com-
puters exchange information through a client-server relationship.47 Current
technology enables this networking for three reasons.4" First, programs, not
computers, communicate by using the common protocol software to exchange
information.4 9 Second, the TCP/IP software does not actually create or run
application programs."0 Rather, the protocol permits one program to call
another, and communication occurs once the receiving program "answers.ISI
Last, because computers can run more than one program at the same time, a
single server can accommodate a large number of users virtually simulta-
neously. 2 For example, a single server can provide services for users within
the network, as well as provide information to multiple users calling from
outside a network. 3 Thus, networking of multiple computers and users
becomes possible at a local level. Because of the flexibility of the software
its software, it is possible to argue that most computers already use the same software, regard-
less of an entity's individual computing needs. See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 980 F.
Supp. 537,539-40 (D.D.C. 1997).
47. See COMER, supra note 40, at 123-24 (explaining that client-server relation permits
diversity of services on Internet). Scientists use the term "distributed computing" to refer to this
seemingly arbitrary phenomenon of interaction between computers of varying sizes and
complexity. Id. at 122. In client-server relationships, the server computer offers programs and
files that the client computer accesses. Id. 123-24. Communication then occurs between the
server program and the client program. Id. at 124. Typically, individual users employ client
programs to access information available through server programs. Id. The server, however,
always must be ready to receive requests for information. Id. at 125. If the server's computer
operating system fails, then anyone using the server program will lose connection. Id. As long
as the server program continues to run, then it will continue to execute information delivery.
Id. If the server program is not available, then the client software will get an error message and
will be unable to communicate with the server. Id.
48. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (explaining networking technology).
49. See COMER, supra note 40, at 123 (explaining that software, not computers, communi-
cates). Comer explains that a common misstatement among Internet users is that their "comput-
ers have communicated." Id. He comments that while the distinction seems trivial, it is impor-
tant to understanding how a single computer can engage in "multiple conversations with other
computers." Id.
50. See id. (stating that transfer of data over Internet does not automatically start programs
on receiving machine).
51. See id. (analogizing computer program interaction to telephone conversation in which
communication only occurs if receiving computer program answers). A client computer's "call"
does not trigger a response from the server, rather, computers only communicate when the
server computer is already available to "answer" calls from the client computer. Id. If the server
computer is not available to answer, then the software programs cannot communicate. Id.
52. See id. (stating that computers can run more than one program at same time). Com-
puters can even run more than one copy of the same program at the same time. Id. at 124. This
capacity permits the computer to serve a large number of users simultaneously. Id.
53. See id. By running multiple copies ofthe same program, server computers can seem-
ingly run the same program for multiple users virtually simultaneously. Id.
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protocols, the Internet can then provide diverse information and services for
a large number of simultaneous users.'
B. Accessing and Using the Internet
Individuals access the resources of and communicate over the Internet in
two principal ways.55 Networks connected to the Internet typically are avail-
able to computer users through employers, universities, or even public librar-
ies."6 Alternatively, individuals can access the Internet through a personal
computer that is connected via modem to an ISP, such as CompuServe or
America Online, that provides Internet access for a fee.5 After connecting to
the ISP's proprietary network, the user then can link to the Internet." The
ISP's proprietary network generally provides its own information and services
to the subscribers in addition to access to the resources of the Internet.59
These various options for connecting to the Internet have made the Internet
and its resources available to an ever-increasing number of people.'
Once having accessed the Internet, an individual can research available
sources and communicate with other users in a variety of ways.6' Two of the
54. See id. at 122 (discussing effect of distributed computing on Intemret, permitting many
different types of services for Internet users). Comer also points out that the variety of available
services results in a variety of-ways to interact over the Intemet. Id. at 122-25.
55. See ACLU I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832-34 (E-D. Pa. 1996) (elaborating on different
options for connecting to Internet). In addition to access from a home or work computer, one
can connect to the Internet from computers located at schools, libraries, or storefront computer
coffees shops. Id.
56. See id. (enumerating different types of networks that can provide Internet access).
57. See id. (stating that one can use modems in personal computers to access network that
provides connection to Internet); see also Perritt, supra note 40, at 17 (stating that as number
of users interested in Internet access has increased, so has interest in services providing Internet
connections). Perritt states that there are thousands of companies that provide Internet access.
Id. These ISPs can be local or national. National companies include America Online, Compu-
Serve, Microsoft, and AT&T. Id. Some companies, such as AT&T and MCI, offer Internet
connections in addition to their other services. Id. Individuals connect to the ISP through
modem and phone line, and once connected to the ISP's network, the user can then gain access
to the larger Internet Id.
58. See ACLUI, 929 F. Supp. at 833 (stating that individuals can access ISP's proprietary
computer network and utilize those resources and also thereby access resources of Internet).
59. See id. (stating that ISPs provide access to extensive content on own proprietary
computer network in addition to access to Internet resources).
60. See id. at 832-34 (explaining that people can access Internet from variety of outlets,
including home and work computers). Although because of the Internet's decentralized nature
it is difficult to determine the number of people accessing the Internet, there is no doubt that the
number is growing rapidly. Id. at 830-31. Experts estimated that Internet use would grow to
over 200 million users by the year 1999. Id.
61. See id. at 834 (observing that there are many methods of communication available
through Internet).
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most well-known methods are remote information retrieval through the Web
and one-to-one messaging via e-mail.62 Each of these methods is a different
medium through which users communicate at differing levels of interactivity.'
Information provided on Web pages can achieve renarkable dispersion;'
however, the information on Web pages is available only to those who actively
search for the information.6' By using a common computer language, creators
of Web pages make their information easily retrievable by anyone using the
Interet.' To access the available information, Internet users formulate
62. See idL (listing most common methods of communications on Internet including e-
mail, "list servs," USENET newsgroups, and real time "chat rooms"). Because technology
changes rapidly, it is difficult to create a complete list at any given moment Id.
63. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,1123-24 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (differentiating among Web sites by describing sliding scale of interactivity between
merely posting information and actively promoting and conducting business over Internet); see
also CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding personal
jurisdiction based on defendant's conducting business by electronic transmissions); Cumbow,
supra note 37, at 667 (stating that Internet is not physical "space" but rather medium of com-
munication). Cumbow argues, for example, that e-mail and the Web are not distinct locations
on the Internet, but rather they are different ways of using the Interact. Id. at 667-68. Under
personal jurisdiction analysis, a court must determine whether or not the defendant has suffi-
cient minimum contacts with the forum. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945); see infra notes 90-94 (discussing Internet related cases that address personal
jurisdiction issue). See generally David D. Tyler, Note, Personal Jurisdiction via E-mail: Has
Personal Jurisdiction Changed in the Wake of CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson?, 51 ARK. L. REV.
429 (1998) (concluding that in assessing personal jurisdiction, courts will have to analyze
electronic contacts, including e-mail, on case-by-case basis, but that e-mail can be basis ofjuris-
diction ifit meets standards of personal jurisdiction inquiry).
64. See ACLU I, 929 F. Supp. 824,836-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (explaining that Web's design
makes information available to potentially very large audience); see also ACLU v. Reno, 521
U.S. 844, 870 (1997) [hereinafter ACLU I] (articulating appreciation for breadth of potential
audience for information available on Web).
65. See ACLUI, 929 F. Supp. at 834-37 (discussing Web site information posting and its
availability only to those who reek it).
66. See id. at 837-38 (stating that publishers must format information to common Web
standards in order to publish information on Web using Web pages). In order to "publish"
information on a Web page, or on a Web site, a user must have a computer connected to the
Internet and that computer must run software that is "server software." Id.; see supra note 47
(explaining "server software"). Furthermore, the user must publish the material in "hypertext"
markup language (HTML), which is the common language for all materials accessible over the
Internet ACLUI, 929 F. Supp. at 836. Publishing in HTML allows publishers to make their
information available in a wide variety of "documents," from plain text to advanced graphics
and animation. Id. The standardized formatting provides a common set of rules in order to
allow information exchanges. Id. Although Web pages generally are accessible to all users,
Web publishers do have the option to make their information accessible only to those with
authorization. Id.; see also M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: CyberspatialSettings and




searches which they submit to search engines that run the search through many
available Web pages.67 The search engine then presents a list of Web pages
that might contain the desired information." Web browsers, software inter-
faces between a computer and the Intemet, then allow the user to view, to
retrieve, and to move among (browse) the search results.69 To facilitate
information retrieval, Web pages and documents often have links to other Web
pages that contain related information." Thus, by browsing the Web, com-
puter users can access the mass of information available over the Internet. 1
Another wayto utilize the Internet is through e-mail, which, in its simplest
application, involves sending a single message to a targeted audience rather
than waiting for someone to access the information.72 Thus, e-mail is similar
to sending a letter, albeit without a thirty-three cent stamp.7" However, e-mail
is vastly more complex than a letter sent by regular mail because one instanta-
67. See ACLUI, 929 F. Supp. at 837 (explaining that numerous "search engines" facilitate
finding information on Web). Search engines are services that routinely catalog the content of
both the Internet and the Web and allow users to search for information using key words. Id.
68. See id. (explaining how search engines permit users to find information on Internet).
69. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.,An AntitrustRemedy orMonopoly Leveraging byElec-
tronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 4 n.19 (1998) (defining and explaining use of Web
browsers); see also Daniel Kadlec,AT&T Betting on Its Bundle, TIME, Feb. 15,1999, at 44, 47
(documenting how Web browsing is changing). Browsing the Web is changing as more Web
sites become "portals." See Michael Krantz, Star Wars, TIME, Feb. 15, 1999, at 47. "Portals"
are "supersites" from which a user can access search engines and direct links to shopping and
news. Id.
70. See ACLU l1 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997) (explaining that one document or Web page
often has links to other related Web pages or documents). A link, or hyperlink, is highlighted text
or graphics on a Web page that a user can select and that automatically sends the user to another
Web page without having to type in a new address. See Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat
thePast: TheReemergence ofMisappropriation andOtherCommonLawTheoriesofProtection
forIntellectualProperty, 11 HARV. JUL. & TECH. 401,419 n.87 (1998) (explaining "links").
71. See ACLU 1, 929 F. Supp. 824, 836 (ED. Pa. 1996) (describing Web as one of
several methods to communicate using Internet). The Web is but one way by which users of
the Internet post and retrieve information. Id.
72. See id. at 834-37 (discussing one-to-one messaging and Web site information posting).
73. See id. at 834 (explaining that, in principle, sending e-mail message is similar to send-
ing letter to single recipient, although e-mail does not go through central processing point to
arrive at destination); see also Jan Hemm Pritchard, E-mail Privacy: An Oxymoron?, 53 J. Mo.
B. 239, 239 (1997) (stating that e-mail is different from regular letters because senders believe
themselves to be anonymous and because language in e-mail tends to be more harsh and crude
than in letters or face-to-face conversation); Kevin J. Baum, Comment, E-mail in the Workplace
and the Right of Privay, 42 VIL. L. REV. 1011, 1013 n.18 (1997) (listing commentators who
have noted differences between e-mail and more traditional methods of communication). In
Internet vernacular, people often refer to the United States Postal Service as "snail mail." See
David 3. Loundy, E-Law 4: Computer Information Systems Law & System Operator Liability,
21 SEAT1Mr U. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (1998) (explaining that regular e-mail users refer to U.S. or
land-based mail as "snail mail").
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neously can send a single message that includes not onlytextbut also graphics,
video, and sound.74 E-mail permits users to send messages from their own
network directly to targeted recipients across the globe who have e-mail
addresses on any other network that also is linked to the Internet." Using
computer-run e-mail application software, a user composes a message from a
computer on one network, and then the software sends the message across the
Interet to the recipient's e-mail address onthe same or another network. 6 The
recipient's e-mail software then stores the recipient's e-mail in the recipient's
personal mailbox, which is usually computer disk storage space on the net-
work.77 Of course, storage of large numbers of e-mail can result in an overload
ofthe network's physical limits, causing the system to shut down.7" Neverthe-
less, in general e-mail can be an easy and inexpensive way to send messages.
C. Summary
The Internet provides a large number of people with access to an ex-
tremely varied supply of information.79 Users access the Internet through
affiliated institutions or through ISPs. 0 Internet users then use the Internet
74. See COMER, supra note 40, at 143 (listing services that e-mail systems provide to
permit complex communication).
75. See id. at 152 (explaining that users can send e-mail to recipients on other networks
by using Internet connection). For example, a subscriber of the CompuServe network can send
e-mail to a subscriber of AOL's network. Id.
76. See id. at 144 (describing how individual users participate in e-mail exchanges using
e-mail application software and Internet). A user can send e-mail to one or more addressees.
Id. at 150.
77. See id. at 144 (explaining that each e-mail user has mailbox identified by unique
number address and that computer network stores received e-mail on disk). When e-mail arrives
at the mailbox address, the e-mail software application automatically stores the message in the
user's mailbox. Id. Usually, only the actual user of the mailbox can access the content of the
mailbox. Id. However, oftentimes employers may retain the right to examine the e-mail that
employees send and receive. ScottA. Sundstrom, Note, You've GotMail! (And the Government
Knows It): Applying the Fourth Amendment to Workplace E-Mail Monitoring, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 2064,2064-67 (1998) (commenting upon frequency of e-mail monitoring in workplace).
78. See Gindin, supra note 1, at 1167-68 (stating that excessive amount of e-mail that
online advertisers have sent can overload ISP systems and cause networks to shut down); John
Simons, The Battle over Spain Gets Ugly, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 12, 1997, at 55
(commenting on shut-down of ISP after it received more e-mail than network could process);
see also infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text (discussing costs of spain and excessive
amount of e-mail).
79. See supra note 34 (discussing number of Internet users); see also Krantz, supra note
69, at 46-48 (presenting information on how accessing information over Internet is changing);
see also supra note 69 (discussing changes in Web browsing).
80. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing how users can gain access
to Internet).
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either by browsing the Web or by communicating directly with other users
through e-mail."1 The Web allows an individual or an organization such as
CNN to post information, hoping that another will then access the informa-
tion.' In contrast, e-mail allows a user to send particular information to a
specific targeted recipient: a friend, a consumer, or an interested party.3 A
user can opt to spread his or her message by e-mail, via a Web page, or by
using both methods; choosing one option does not foreclose the other. Thus,
although e-mail and the Web both are media through which a user may access
the resources of the Intemet, they differ markedly in how a user delivers,
receives, or obtains information. 4
I. Judicial and Scholarly Opinions on Internet Regulation
A. Case Law
1. The Lower Courts and the Internet
The Internet has become an interesting battleground for courts and for
commentators.85 Although the Internet has grown rapidly in a relatively short
period of time, few courts confronted Internet issues before 1996.86 The
81. See supra notes 59-76 and accompanying text (discussing how users communicate
and use resources of Internet).
82. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing Web use).
83. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing use of e-mail).
84. See David I. Goldstone, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Cyber Forum:
Public vs. Private in Cyberspace Speech, 69 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1, 10 (1998) (suggesting that
eyberspace is analogous to city that has numerous fora rather than single unitary forum and
analogizing e-mail and Web to neighborhoods).
85. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (granting plaintiff's
motion for preliminary injunction against enforcement of Child Online Protection Act (COPA)
on grounds that COPA violates First Amendment); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willa-
mette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1195 (D. Or. 1998)
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment because issue of material fact existed as
to whether Web page constituted "true threat" against abortion services providers). The
Planned Parenthood case recently went to trial and ended with a $107 million jury verdict for
the plaintiffs. See Adam Cohen, Cyberspeech on Trial, TIME, Feb. 15,1998, at 52,52 (discuss-
ing verdict).
86. See MichaelA. Geist, The Reality ofBytes: RegulatingEconomicActM'y in theAge
of the Internet, 73 WAsH. L. REV. 521,531 (1998) (observing that Internet "law" did not truly
develop until after 1996, despite Internet's rapid growth). The Internet's growth began with the
introduction of Mosaic browser software in 1993. Id. EarlyInternet users seemed to prefer self-
regulation. Id. at 532. Thus, the lack of case law is not surprising. For a brief discussion of the
self-regulating nature of the early Internet, see Michael W. Carroll, Garbage In: Emerging
Media and Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial Solicitations, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L. 233,
254 (1996); Richard C. Lee, Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 417,424 (1998). Other commentators also have discussed how rules for regulating
the Internet have arisen. See L Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regimefor "Cyberspace," 55
U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 1015-25 (discussing ways in which rules for regulating Internet have
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paucity of case law led the first courts addressing issues arising from Internet
activity simply to analogize Internet issues to issues in existing law as a basis
for decision making,' but the courts often failed to examine and to fully
understand the underlying activity actually occurring on the Internt. 8 In
failing to distinguish among various Internet activities, the courts did not
adequately address factual differences among the cases that might have led to
different and more consistent results. 9
Some of the first Internet-related cases addressed the threshold question
of whether courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants.rc Initially, some courts found that a party's mere presence on the Web
by maintaining a Web site amounted to sufficient contact to allow the exercise
arisen); Lawrence Lessig, The Constitution of Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Crifiques
of CyberspaceRegulation, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 181,183 (1997) [hereinafer Lessig, The
Constitution of Code] (outlining ways in which norms regulate behavior in cyberspace).
87. See Geist, supra note 86, at 532 (noting that courts addressed early cases involving
Internet with uncertainty). A Wisconsin court refused to extend the state's libel statute defini-
tion of "periodical" to include a computer network bulletin board. Id. (citing It's in the Cards,
Inc. v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11, 14-15 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)). The Wisconsin court decided
that because of the rapid changes and growth of technology, expanding the statutory definition
of "periodical" would amount to judicial legislating. It's in the Cards, Inc., 535 N.W.2d at 14-
15; see Geist, supra note 86, at 532 (commenting upon court's decision to avoid making
decision about effect of computer network on libel law).
88. See Geist, supra note 86, at 533 (stating that courts did not analyze underlying activity
in Internet cases but rather attempted to analogize Internet to existing legal systems). Scholars
have made various analogies to existing legal paradigms including national advertising, admir-
alty law, Antarctica law, outer space law, and environmental litigation. See id. at 546; see
also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(discussing different types of Internet activity ranging from purely passive information posting
to clearly conducting commercial transactions). The federal district court in Zippo also stated
that there is a middle ground "occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange
information with the host computer." Id. The court further explained that "exercise of juris-
diction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the
exchange of information that occurs on the Web site." Id.
89. See Christopher W. Meyer, Note, World Wide Web Advertising: PersonalJurisdic-
tion Around the Whole Wide World?, 54 WASIL &LEE L. REV. 1269,1301-02 (1997) (suggest-
ing that use of either "mere placement" test or "additional conduct" test for assessing personal
jurisdiction is too rigid and that courts need to use more flexible test to analyze minimum
contacts in Web setting). Meyer discusses the different tests that courts have applied to juris-
dictional analysis using Web advertising contacts. Id. at 1300-23.
90. See infra notes 91-92 (listing early cases involving jurisdictional questions). Courts
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant has sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum such that the exercise ofjurisdiction comports with notions of"fair play
and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)). The standard is flexible and thus allows
courts to analyze now types of contacts and combinations in order to find personal jurisdiction.
See Meyer, supra note 89, at 1271 (discussing flexibility of personal jurisdiction standard).
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ofpersonal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. 1 However, the courts
soon began to recognize that mere Web presence without more was not
enough to warrant an exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants.92 Courts acknowledged that the "nature and quality' 93 of the conduct
over the Internet, rather than mere presence on the Internet, should affect the
determination of personal jurisdiction.94
Beyond the question of jurisdiction, courts have addressed a variety of
complaints arising from the Internet.9' Important cases have concerned ISP
91. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass.
1997) (recognizing that minimum contacts with forum included Web site); Cody v. Ward, 954
F. Supp. 43, 47 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding personal jurisdiction based in part on e-mail sent to
forum); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (exercising jurisdiction
based on newspaper ad but commenting upon importance of defendant's Web contacts); EDIAS
Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 422 (D. Ariz. 1996) (finding
minimum contacts from e-mail and Web use); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F.
Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (using Web presence as contact for finding personal jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendant); Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715,
720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding jurisdiction based on gambling page on Web).
92. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130 F.3d 414,419-20 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that defendant's Web site did not amount to purposeful availment for personal jurisdiction);
Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D.N.L 1997) (declining to find personal
jurisdiction based solely on Internet presence); Hearst v. Goldberger, 96-Civ. 3620, 1997 WL
97097, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (same); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.
Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same). See generally Howard B. Stravitz, PersonalJurisdic-
ion in Cyberspace: SomethingMore is Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49
S.C. L. REV. 925 (1998) (discussing modem jurisdictional doctrine and how courts use it in
connection with Internet cases); Meyer, supra note 89 (arguing for restraint in courts' attempts
to use nonresident defendants' Web advertising activities as basis for personal jurisdiction).
93. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
In Zippo, the court examined several cases discussing the relationship between Web sites and
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1123-25. The court stated that the likelihood that a court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant is directly proportional to the nature and quality
of the commercial activity that the defendant conducts via the Internet contact in question. Id.
at 1124. In Zippo, the defendant actually conducted business on its Internet site by selling
passwords to subscribers to its Web service. Id. at 1125-26. The court found that by doing
business over the Web page, rather than merely advertising its business, the defendant's activ-
ities constituted purposeful availment of the benefits of doing business in the forum state. Id.
After considering the other prongs of the test for jurisdiction, the court determined that jurisdic-
tion was proper. Id. at 1126-27.
94. See id. at 1124 (finding that "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitu-
tionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that
an entity conducts over the Internet"); see also Geist, supra note 86, at 540 (stating that courts
have changed focus in jurisdictional analysis to focus on nature and quality of commercial
activity on Internet). Courts have realized that Internet activity is as varied as daily life. Id. at
538. Thus, courts can no longer categorize all Internet activity as one type of activity fitting into
one analogy. Id.
95. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing various issues that have
arisen from Internet cases).
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liability for defamatory statements thatthe ISP's subscribers posted onnetwork
bulletin boards.96 Other Internet-related cases have applied the First Amend-
ment,9 interpreted federal statutes, applied harassment and employment
laws,9 and protected privacy rights.' 0
96. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding
commercial ISP to be publisher within meaning of Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(cXl) (Supp. ]11996), and thus, 47 U.S.C. § 230(cX1) protected defendant from liability
for defamatory statements that ISP subscriber posted on defendant's service); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52-58 (D.D.C. 1998) (granting summary judgment to defendants in
defamation action against ISP); Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding CompuServe to be distributor, not publisher, of information available
on its computer network "forums," thus, applicable standard of liability was that of distributor,
not publisher). According to Zeran, 47 U.S.C. § 230(cX1) immunizes ISPs from liability for
information posted by third parties. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328. But see Stratton Oakmont Inc.
v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, *7 (N.Y. Sup. Court., May 24, 1995) (holding ISP
liable as publisher for defamatory statements that unidentified third party made); see also
Meyerson, supra note 2, at 140-45 (discussing early cases and law about ISPs' liability for
speech carried on their services); Development I, The LongArm of Cyber-reach, 112 HARv.
L. REV. 1610, 1612-22 (1999) (discussing development of defamation actions arising from
information posted on Internet Web pages).
97. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 795 (E.D. Va.
1998) (using First Amendment analysis and holding that public library could not adopt and
enforce content-based restrictions to block access to Internet sites featuring obscenity or child
pornography absent compelling state interest and means narrowly tailored to end); Urofsky v.
Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634, 643.44 (ED. Va. 1998) (holding that statute limiting state employee
access to sexually explicit materials violated First Amendment), rev'd sub nom. Urofsky v.
Gilmore, 167 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1999).
98. See United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375,1388 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (examining e-
mail for content that is necessary to constitute "true threat" in interstate commerce under 18
U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994)); see also Sally Greenberg, Threats, Harassmen4 and Hate On-
Line: RecentDevelopments, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 673,680 (1997) (discussing development of
law regarding threats of physical violence and usefulness in applying such law to threats trans-
mitted on-line). Consider also the threat that a Florida youth recently sent via the Internet to a
current student at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. Internet Threat Closes
ColumbineHigh School, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,1999, atA27. This threathas resulted in afederal
indictment 2 Indicted, 1 Probed in Columbine Threats, DENV. POST, Jan. 11, 2000, atA09.
99. See Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 1997 WL 793004, at *1-*4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24,
1997) (explaining background of suit against employer after employee received racist e-mail at
work); Bohach v. Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236-37 (D. Nev. 1996) (finding that employer's
reading of employees' electronic messages did not violate privacy laws). For a discussion of
employer's potential liability for employee e-mail, see Henry H. Perrit, Jr., LAW AND THE
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY § 4.30A (Supp. 1999). Discussing the effect of the Internet on
labor law, one commentator explains that the Internet has not changed the application of existing
law. See Geist, supra, note 86, at 557-58. Rather, the Internet has added a medium of communi-
cation and facilitated the potentially offensive activity. Id. Thus, the application of the law in
a workplace harassment case will be the same whether the harassment was through an e-mal or
a paper memo. Id.
100. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 459 (5th Cir.
1994) (stating that federal district court had determined that Secret Service violated Privacy
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2. The Supreme Court and the Internet
Because ofthe potentially intrusive nature of computers, akin to "Orwell-
ian mischief,'10 1 several United States Supreme Court Justices have expressed
concern over the potential effects of computers on civil liberties and criminal
law."° In spite of the reservations of some of its members, the Court has
increasingly accepted the importance of new tecmology.1°3 However, the
Protection Act when it read e-mail stored on properly seized computer system); Smyth v. Pills-
bury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97,101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that company's interception of employee
e-mail received over employer's computer system did not constitute violation of employees'
privacy); see also Pritchard, supra note 73, at 240-43 (discussing case law on e-mail and privacy);
Sundstrom, supra note 77, at 2064-67 (commenting upon frequency of e-mail monitoring in
workplace).
101. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 25 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona
v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869,872 (Az. 1994)).
102. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61,96 n2 (1974) (Douglas, 3., dissenting) (com-
menting about effects of computers and suggesting that "we live in an Orwellian age" in which
computers are turning society into transparent world); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (warning that Court's holding in Fourth Amend-
ment case would permit "technology to override the limits of law in the area of criminal investi-
gation"); Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus, Hurtling into Cyberspace: As the Court Guides New
Technology Through OldLaw-Expect a Few Bumps, 45 FED. LAW. 38,40 (1998) (comment-
ing on Supreme Court's attitude toward computer technology and how Court's attitude has been
changing).
103. SeeDenverAreaEduc. Telecomm. ConsortiumInc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,742(1996)
(acknowledging role of technology in determining what standard of review to apply). In his
plurality opinion, Justice Breyer refused to choose a specific level of First Amendment review
for government regulation on cable television. Id. "[A]ware as we are of the changes taking
place in the law, the technology, and the industrial structure, related to telecommunications, we
believe it unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words
now." Id. at 742 (citations omitted). Although the issue in DenverArea Educational Telecom-
munications was the government's attempt to regulate cable television, the opinion nonetheless
demonstrates that at least some members of the Court recognize the importance of carefully
selecting standards of review in the area of new technology. Id.; see also Mark S. Kende, The
Supreme Court's Approach to the FirstAmendment in Cyberspace: Free Speech as Technol-
ogy's Hand-Maiden, 14 CONST. CoMMENTARY 465,466-72 (1997) (discussing Denver Area
Educational Telecommunications and analyzing legal reasoning behind it). For some interesting
examples of cases in which courts have not recognized the importance of a new and emerging
technology, see Mutual Films Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230,244 (1915),
overruled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), which ruled that the Ohio
Constitution does not protect motion pictures because they are merely "spectacles" and are not
part of the press or of public expression; see also GreaterFremon Inc. v. City ofFremont, 302
F. Supp. 652, 665 (N.D. Ohio 1968), ajfd sub nom. Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of
Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548,549 (6th Cir. 1970), which rejected the classification of cable television
as a public utility because the public's need for it is akin to the public's need for "hand carved
ivory backscratchers." See generally The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888) (marveling at
telephone's ability to transmit full piano chords, sounds of other musical instruments, and even
human voice).
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Court has had only one opportunity directly to address Intemet issues.' °4
In Reno v. ACLU,"° the Court held thatthe provisions of the Communi-
cations Decency Act (CDA) prohibiting transmissions of "indecent" or "pa-
tently offensive" material to minors violated the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution.1" The Court announced that it would scrutinize the statute under the
most rigid First Amendment standards. The Court distinguished the Inter-
net from traditional broadcast media,les which is entitled to less protection
104. See ACLU IL 521 U.S. 844,849 (1997) (agreeing with lower court determination that
portions of Communications Decency Act violated First Amendment). In fact, a search on
Westlaw in the Supreme Court database with the term "Internet" retrieves only two cases other
thanACLU H that mention the Internet: National Endowmentfor the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569,605-06 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting), which cites toACLUHl, and DenverAreaEducation
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,776-77 (1996), in which Justice Souter
argues, in a concurring opinion, that applying the same First Amendment standards to all
communication media will have immense and unknowable effects.
105. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
106. See ACLU I 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (affirming district court's determination that
portions of Communications Decency Act violated First Amendment). Congress enacted the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA).
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act to encourage
"the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." ACLU H, 521 U.S. at 857
(quoting language of TCA). The plaintiffs, including the American Civil Liberties Union,
challenged the CDA's provisions that prohibited the transmission or display of indecent or
patently offensive materials over the Internet in any manner that would permit minors to access
such transmissions or displays. Id. at 857-61. First, the Court rejected the government's
argument that the restrictions were merely time, place, and manner restrictions, because the
restrictions at issue directly applied to content Id. at 864-68. The Court then acknowledged
that every medium of speech, including the Internet, has its own special issues. Id. at 868-70.
Cyberspace never has been subject to the type of government regulation that has attended the
broadcast media. Id. The Court agreed with the district court's finding that the Internet is not
invasive in the same way as is television or radio. Id. Additionally, warnings alerting the user
to sexual content appear on Web sites. Id. at 854. Therefore, a user is less likely to happen
upon sexual content accidentally. Id. Furthermore, the Court observed that the Internet is not
a scarce commodity and has virtually unlimited, low-cost capacity for all types of information.
Id. at 870. Thus, the governmental regulation of the Internet will not receive the qualified First
Amendment scrutiny applied to the broadcast media. Id. The Court then noted that the CDA's
provisions diminished the free speech rights of adults. Id. at 874. The Court stated that the
breadth of the CDA's coverage was unprecedented. Id. at 877. Furthermore, the provisions
were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the purported goal of protecting juveniles. Id.
at 879. Consequently, the Court upheld the 'district court's determination that the provisions
in question violated the First Amendment Id. at 885.
107. See id. at 868 (announcing that Court would review CDA under most rigid First
Amendment scrutiny).
108. See id. at 868-69 (distinguishing broadcast media from Internet because federal gov-
ernment has history of strong regulation of broadcast media but no history of regulating
Internet).
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from government regulation under the First Amendment because of a "band-
width scarcity" rationale. 09 The Court stated that it intends to approach the
Internet as a distinct medium of communication with its own "set of rules.""10
Its dynamic aspects, its versatility, and its democratizing value had impressed
the Court."'
In rejecting the breadth of the CDA's content-based prohibitions,"' the
Court expressed concern that parents would not be able to allow their children
to access information of which the parents approved."' The Court also
denouncedthe CDA's constraints on adult speech, stating that "[t]he CDA...
threatens to torch a large segment of the Internet community.""14 The Court
109. See Red Lion Broad. Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,375-77 (1969) (using rationale that
scarcity of broadcast frequencies and large number of competing voices permits greater
regulation of broadcast media and is consistent with First Amendment).
110. SeeACLUII, 521 U.S. at 868-70 (stating that each medium of expression will present
problems unique to that medium). The Court observed that there are "special justifications for
regulation of the broadcast media that are not applicable to other speakers." Id. at 868. The
Court stated that the rationale for regulation of broadcast media, as distinct from other media,
arises from a history of extensive government regulation of broadcast medium, a scarcity of
available broadcast frequencies, and the invasive nature of broadcast media. Id. According to
the Court, those factors do not arise in the Internet context Id. For the Supreme Court cases
that have developed these factors, see TurnerBroadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-
38 (1994); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989); and Red Lion
Broadcastinglnc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,375-77 (1969).
111. SeeACLUH, 521 U.S. at 870 (articulating broad accessibility and unlimited capacity
of Interet as conditions that distinguish Internet from traditional broadcast media). The Court
said, "[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier
with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web
pages, mail exploders, and news-groups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer." Id.;
see also Kende, supra note 103, at 475 (commenting that Supreme Court seemingly has em-
braced Internet as positive social force).
112. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (Supp. 1997) (prohibiting
transmission of indecent material to recipient known to be under 18 years old). Congress stated
that the purpose of the Telecommunications Act was to "encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies." ACLU II, 521 U.S. at 857 (quoting Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,110 Stat 56 (1996)). The Act primarily deals with competi-
tion in local telephone, multichannel video, and over-the-air broadcasting markets, however,
and not the Internet. Id. at 857-58. In fact, the CDA was only one of seven titles in the Tele-
communications Act Id. at 858. The CDA prohibited transmissions of "indecent" or "patently
offensive" material that would be accessible to minors. Id. at 859.
113. See ACLUII, 521 U.S. at 878 (stating that overbreadth of CDA's prohibitions would
inhibit even parental controls of their children's Internet access). The Court expressed concern
that a speaker could not "confidently assume that a serious discussion about birth control
practices, homoseuality... or the consequences of prison rape would not violate the CDA."
Id. at 871.
114. Id. at 882. The Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the CDA's
restrictions unduly burdened protected free speech. Id.
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asserted that it would consider it inappropriate to constrain unnecessarily adult
communication over the Internet. n 5 Last, the Court rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that the CDA would foster the unfettered growth of the
Internet, concluding instead that given the already exponential growth of the
Internet, the presence of pornography or adult content likely would not hinder
the growth of the medium." 6
Given the Court's approach to the Internet as a medium distinct from
other communications media," 7 lower courts might follow the Court's lead
and approach Internet issues as not necessarily identical to, although related
to, other areas of the law. Perhaps the Court's lead will result in lower courts'
approaching different Internet-related issues as discrete. The Court's ap-
proach might allow lower courts to apply varying theories to issues arising
within the same method of Internet communication. For example, a court
might apply a contract theory to one type of e-mail contact,"" while applying
a tort theory to another type of e-mail contact." 9 In sum, the newness of the
Internet demonstrates that courts have ample opportunity for creative applica-
tion of the common law. 2' Scholarly reaction has been no less diverse than
the courts' reactions. 21
115. See id. at 874-79 (discussing unacceptability of restrictions on adult speech when less
restrictive alternatives could achieve purported purpose of statute).
116. See id. at 885 (rejecting Government's assumption that content regulation is necessary
to promote Internet expansion). The Government argued that people would eventually stop
using the Internet because of the presence of pornography. Id. The Court found the Govern-
ment's argument "singularly unpersuasive" given that the record had demonstrated phenomenal
growth, not contraction. Id.
117. See id. at 851 (recognizing Internet as communication medium comprised of many
methods of communication and information retrieval). The Court commented that cyberspace
is not located in any particular geographic space, but users anywhere in the world can access
its resources through the Internet Id.
118. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1996) (explain-
ing contract action based on electronic transmissions).
119. See America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (ED. Va. 1998) (finding
liability for common-law tort of trespass to chattels when advertiser spammed ISP's customers);
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (grant-
ing preliminary injunction to ISP based in part on common law theory of trespass to chattels).
120. See Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settle-
ment: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 859 (1999) (stating that adapting
"to economic and cultural change is also one of the common law's features"). Rendleman also
makes the point that being flexible and tailoring solutions to particular disputes are features of
the common law. Id. However, when society changes rapidly, earlier precedential decisions
may hold little sway or may be wrong. l As applied in the context of the Interet, applying
the common law will allow the courts to be flexible to issues arising from the rapidly changing
technology.
121. See infra Part M.B (discussing various commentators' views on approaches to devel-
opment of Intemet law).
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B. Commentators' Views
Scholars and commentators have taken avariety ofapproaches to the issue
of Internet regulation."z Some scholars have argued that traditional legal
notions regarding physical space will not properly apply to regulating the
Internet." These scholars argue that Internet interactions crossing territorial
boundaries have created a new and discernable space. 24 Because this new
medium does not confine itself to geographical boundaries, territorially based
sovereigns cannot adequately regulate cyberspace activities." Thus, accord-
ingto these scholars, this new "territory" ofcyberspace demands its own law 26
122. See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text (discussing various approaches to
Internet regulation).
123. See David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1378-81 (1996) (arguing that traditional notions of legal
regulation will not work in cyberspace context); Katsh, supra note 66, at 1685-92 (suggesting
that differentiations between electronic space and print space should result in orientation of First
Amendment in eyberspace around "electronic" space rather than print space). The crux of
Post's and Johnson's argument is that traditional legal notions are grounded in physical borders
and that without those borders it will be impossible to govern eyberspace in the same manner
as the physical world. Id. at 1378-80; see also John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of
Internet Regulation, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 207, 234 (1997) (criticizing attempts at regulating
Internet and characterizing them as being parochial and overly limiting); Joel R. Reidenberg,
Governing Networks andRule-Makingin Cyberspace, in BoRDERS iN CYBERSPACE 84,96-100
(Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997) (arguing that borders marking national sovereignty
will not suffice for determining which government should govern network issues, and that new
network governance paradigm must emerge to establish norms of conduct for computer net-
works). Butsee Jack L. GoldsmithAgainst Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CH L. REV. 1199,1200-1201
(1998) (arguing against Post's and Johnson's conclusion that "real space" law cannot properly
apply to cyberspace).
124. See Johnson & Post, supra note 123, at 1367, 1378-81 (stating that cyberspace is
distinct place for purposes of legal analysis). Post and Johnson posit that cyberspace users
know when they have entered the "other space" because of the process it takes to get there -
passing through a "border" of computer screens and passwords. Id. at 1379.
125. Id. at 1375. The authors explain that because physical boundaries do not separate
Internet activities, no particular jurisdiction has a compelling claim exclusively to subject Inter-
net users to that jurisdiction's laws. Id. Another scholar suggests that government regulation
should differ according to the particular Internet activity that the state seeks to regulate. See
Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring and Supporting a New
Frontier, 11 IIARV. J. L. & TEcH. 429, 441-52 (1998) (positing that propriety of state govern-
ment power to regulate cyberspace depends upon type of activity that state seeks to regulate).
Salbu argues that some activities should not be subject to state regulation simply because there
is no "local" interest in regulating the behavior. Id. at 441-42. At the other end of the spectrum,
Salbu observes that some Internet activities are "so novel that they create unique regulatory
challenges. Other facets of the Internet may create a new spin on an old theme." Id. at 441.
126. See Johnson & Post, supra note 123, at 1387 (explaining that because authors call for
legal authority not based in geographic territory, it will be necessary to create new legal insti-
tutions to govern cyberspace).
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Another scholar has urged courts and legislatures to take a restrained
approach to regulating the Inter net,' suggesting that cyberlaw, law specific
to the Internet should develop as has all common law, with incremental
changes that lead slowly to more fundamental changes."2 In addition, some
scholars have suggested that change to existing law is not necessary and that
Internet regulation issues are analogous to issues arising in other legal con-
texts.' These scholars have concluded that existing legal schemes will pro-
vide the answers to the dilemmas of Internet regulation.!30 Finally, some
scholars have suggested that the limitations of-the technology itself can be the
source of the regulatory framework.' Thus, they have argued that new regu-
lations will not be the only or the best source of regulation because the natural
constraints of the technology will better regulate the activity.
3 2
The scholarship has encouraged the courts to consider more creative
applications of the law. In discussing how to regulate the Internet, if at all,
commentators are suggesting that the courts emphasize the nature and quality
of the InteMet contacts."' Thus, the courts should not approach all Internet-
related cases as identical to each other, and courts should refrain from ap-
127. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE W. 1743, 1744 (1995)
(urging approach to cyberspace regulation that will let "experience catch up with the technol-
ogy").
128. See id. at 1745 (suggesting that common law's "constructive function" will allow law
to develop as understanding of medium develops). Lessig argues that First Amendment
jurisprudence particularly should respond slowly. Id. at 1752-53. He predominantly is inter-
ested in the Court's allowing the salient issues to develop fully before trying to "ventur[e] too
boldly into [the Interet's] regulation." Id. at 1752; cf Keller, supra note 70, at 427 (observing
that it is unrealistic to expect statutory law to be able to keep up with changes in computer tech-
nology and that common law will be more responsive to changes).
129. See Geist, supra note 86, at 546 (stating that scholars have made various analogies
to existing legal paradigms including national advertising, admiralty law, Antarctica law, outer
space law, and environmental litigation).
130. See id. at 546-47 (listing variety of situations and paradigms to which scholars have
compared Internet).
131. See id. at 549 (observing that commentators are recognizing limits of technology itself
as wayto determine what and howto regulate Internet); Lessig, The Constitution of Code, supra
note 86, at 183-84 (suggesting that nature of technology will permit technology to be indirect
regulatory framework for Internet); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554-55 (1998) (positing
that "[t]echnological capabilities and system design choices impose rules on participants" over
and above those that law and government regulation impose).
132. See Lessig, The Constitution of Code, supra note 86, at 185-86 (suggesting that
computer technology limitations will assist regulation because it provides additional indirect
regulation); Reidenberg, supra note 131, at 577-86 (suggesting ways in which information
technology will provide rules for regulating cyberspace).
133. See Geist, supra note 86, at 548-49 (commenting on trend in legal scholarship toward
analysis of nature and quality of activity on Internet before categorically reaching given result).
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proaching Internet-related cases as cases that are wholly distinct from other
areas of law. Furthermore, within the context of the Internet, the nature and
quality of the contacts differ from e-mail to e-mail and from e-mail to the
Web. By considering the nature and quality of Internet activity, courts can
develop law that is responsive to specific e-mail issues, for example, rather
than reflective of a blanket application of a single paradigm to all Internet-
related issues.
IV Commercial ISPs, E-Mail, and Span
Various causes of action arising from Internet activities have presented
interesting issues for the Supreme Court, lower courts, and commentators to
consider.' However, even more interesting than the issues themselves are
the particular contexts in which the Internet issues arise.13 For example, the
Intel case provides an opportunity to examine how private network providers
can protect their interests in their networks.'36 To help the reader understand
how the court approached Intel's problem with the unwanted e-mail from
Hamidi and FACE Intel, this Part examines the ways in which commercial
network owners, ISPs, have protected their interests.
A. The Problem of Spame
The Internet is becoming increasingly commercial as businesses are
advertising their wares on their own Web pages, on others' Web pages, and
by e-mail sent directly to consumers. 37 When advertisers pay for access to
134. See supra Part III (discussing courts' and scholars' approaches to Internet).
135. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (discussing examples of different
Intemet-related litigation).
136. See infra Part V.C (proposing limited application of trespass to land to protect private
network provider's interest); infra notes 154-59, 194-96 and accompanying text (explaining
inadequacy of trespass to chattels for protecting interest and placing explanation in context of
Intel); infra notes 248-55 and accompanying text (discussing importance of private network
provider's interest in network).
137. See William J. Holstein, et al., Click 'Til You Drop, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Dec. 7, 1998, at 42 (discussing increasing use of Internet to buy goods). The article observes
that because of the federal government's current "wait and see" policy with respect to taxing
online purchases, the numbers are likely to continue to grow. See id. at 44; see also Meyer,
supra note 89, at 1281-85 (providing in-depth discussion of different Web advertising methods
and practices); KavitaKaur, The Net: It's Clicked, But WillIt Hit?, COMPUTERS TODAY, Nov.
30, 1998, at 74 (stating that market researchers have estimated that Intemet advertisements will
account for approximately 11% of global revenues). In two cases, the ISP estimated that it had
received up to 60 million e-mail advertisements. See America Online, Inc. v. IMS, Inc., 24 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E-D. Va. 1998) (stating that ISP had received 60 million pieces of e-mail
advertising over ten-month period); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. American Online, Inc., 948 F.
Supp. 436, 438 (ED. Pa. 1996) (discussing ISP's contention that its customers had received
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consumers by paying an ISP for Internet access or by paying a Web page
creator for space on its page, few problems arise.138 Problems do arise, how-
ever, when advertisers access potential consumers by e-mail without paying
for access to those consumers. 39
Recently, the courts have addressed disputes between commercial ISPs
and advertisers who have "spanimed" the ISPs' customers. 4° "Spam" is the
term for unsolicited, bulk e-mail messages.' Sparn has created problems
because some ISPs do not want to fund third-party advertisements to their
literally millions of unsolicited bulk advertising e-mail messages from advertiser). Note that
the Federal Supplement incorrectly lists America Online as American Online. Id.
138. See Carroll, supra note 86, at 265-68 (explaining that problems arise because ISPs
must bear costs of advertising another's product); David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited CommercialE-
mail and the Telephone Consumer ProtectionAct of 1991,45 BuFF. L. REv. 1001, 1006-1012
(1997) (addressing costs to unsolicited bulk e-mail in dollars, time, and resources).
139. See Carroll, supra note 86, at 234 (commenting upon relatively low costs of e-mail).
Carroll seems particularly concerned that "junk e-mail" threatens the viability of an entire mode
of communications. Id. "Because the marginal costs of producing and distributing electronic
junk mail are very low, the incentives for advertisers to flood the network with unsolicited
commercial solicitations are substantial. Left unchecked, this flood of advertisements could
produce a tragedy of the commons." Id.; see Leibowitz, supra note 4, at 10 (stating that
America Online has filed nine lawsuits in five states to stop unsolicited bulk e-mail from coming
onto its system).
140. See America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 549 (E.D. Va. 1998) (discuss-
ing ISP's allegation that unauthorized e-mail messages violated Lanham Act and Virginia
common law of trespass to chattels and nuisance); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (explaining plaintiff's claim of trespass to
personal property or chattels when advertiser sent mass amount of unsolicited e-mail to ISP's
customers); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. American Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436,437-38 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) (noting defendant's argument for right to send unsolicited commercial e-mail to ISP's
customers).
141. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1018 (acknowledging that different parties refer to
mass commercial e-mail as either "bulk e-mail" or "junk e-mail" and that Internet vernacular
calls such e-mail "spam"); Goldstone, supra note 84, at 11 (defining spar as mass advertising
e-mail); Anne. E. Hawley, Comment, TakingSpam out of Your CyberspaceDiet: Common Law
Applied to Bulk UnsolicitedAdvertising via ElectronicMail, 66 U. Mo.-KC. L. REV. 381,381
& n.3 (1997) (explaining that spamming is sending bulk unsolicited commercial e-mail). See
generally Sorkin, supra note 138 (discussing possible methods of regulating unsolicited com-
mercial e-mail, or junk e-mail, under existing statutory regimes and alternatives); Steven E.
Bennett, Note, Canning Spain: CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 32 U. RICIL L.
REV. 545 (1998) (discussing efforts by courts and legislatures to eliminate or regulate junk e-
mail). According to the court in CompuServe, the term spam "derive[s] from a skit performed
on the British television show Monty Python's Flying Circus, in which the word 'spam' is
repeated to the point ofabsurdity in a restaurant menu." CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1018 n.1.
Most references to spam refer to spain as unsolicited, bulk, commercial e-mail; however, there
is little reason that the term cannot apply equally to any unsolicited bulk e-mail. See Sorkin,
supra note 138, at 1003 n.16 (discussing both commercial and noncommercial unsolicited bulk
e-mail, or "spare").
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customers. 42 In order to reduce their own costs and to keep their customers
happy, ISPs need to be able to stop advertisers from sending unsolicited bulk
e-mail over the ISPs' systems to the ISPs' customers.' 43 To stop the advertis-
ers, some ISPs have sued the senders of the unsolicited e-mail on the basis of
a trespass to chattels theory.'
B. Trespass to Chattels May Provide a Theory to Combat Spam
In winning cases against spammers, some ISPs have argued that spain
constitutes a trespass to chattels because it is an intermeddling with a chattel
in another's possession.'45 Under traditional doctrine, an actor can commit a
142. See Goldstone, supra note 84, at 48-52 (addressing costs of unsolicited, commercial
e-mail as being economic externality by imposing costs on recipients); Sorkin, supra note 138,
at 1019 (commenting on sender's shifting advertising costs to recipient ofjunk e-mail or recip-
ient's ISP); Hawley, supra note 141, at 382 (discussing increasing costs of sparn, including
consumption of computer resources); see also Lee, supra note 86, at 427 & n.67 (observing that
costs of storage of mass numbers of e-mail messages fall on recipient ISP and are most expen-
sive aspect of e-mail transmissions); cf Carroll, supra note 86, at 272-74 (arguing against use
of government regulation to shift costs of unsolicited commercial e-mail back to senders on
ground that there is no clear government interest in preventing cost-shifting).
143. See Lee, supra note 86, at 427 n.66 (listing costs to receiving ISP for e-mail message
storage before recipient's retrieval, recipient's retrieval of messages, and recipient's deletion
or storage of messages). Although ISP subscribers also bear some costs, such as having to pay
for the time it takes to delete unwanted mail, these costs are minimal. Id. at 426; see Goldstone,
supra note 84, at 48-50 (discussing various costs that sorting and storing e-mail impose upon
ISPs and receiving networks); Sorkin, supra note 138, at 1010 (stating that costs of receiving
e-mail generally are borne more by ISPs than by individual users). Sorkin notes that some of
the antipathy to commercial e-mail results from the non-commercial origins of the Internet Id.
at 1007. He states that the "economics of the Internet are also of little help: it can be cheaper
to send an advertising message everywhere than to target it to a narrow group of prospects, and
it may be more effective [than hoping recipients] ... will search out the advertiser's home page
on the Web." Id. at 1007-08. For a list of over fifteen cases that ISPs have filed against
spammers, see The John Marshall Law School, Center for Information Technology & Privacy
Law, UnsolicitedE-mail: Cases (visited Jan. 14,2000) <http'/www.jmls.edueyber/cases/spam.
html>.
144. See America Online, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (granting plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment for claim of trespass to chattels when defendant sent unauthorized bulk commercial
e-mail over plaintiff's computer network); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962
F. Supp. 1015, 1028 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding that plaintiff could maintain action for trespass
to chattels).
145. See America Online, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (granting plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment for claim of trespass to chattels when defendant sent unauthorized bulk commercial
e-mail over plaintiff's computer network); CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1028 (finding that
plaintiff could maintain action for trespass to chattels). For additional cases applying trespass
to chattels and conversion to "modern" facts, see United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091,
1098-99 (D. Md. 1994), which applies conversion and trespass to chattels theories to a ease in
which a doctor interfered with the creation of "human cell lines" in a research project, and
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trespass to chattels by using or intermeddling with a chattel that is in the pos-
session of another.146 An actor intermeddles by intentionally bringing about
physical contact with the chattel.147 The requisite intent exists if the actor
commits the act with the purpose of intermeddling or with the knowledge that
intermeddling may result from the act. 4 ' However, if an actor has consent
from the possessor to intermeddle with the chattel, then no cause of action
will arise. 49 The possessor of the chattel can limit or revoke the consent,'
and if the actor exceeds the scope of the consent, then a cause of action for
trespass to chattels will arise.' Furthermore, in some instances a privilege,
irrespective of consent, might insulate an actor from liability for trespass to
chattels.' Privileges include the use of public utilities, the defense of land
or chattels, self defense, and public necessity.'
A plaintiff also must prove that the actor's interference caused harm. 4
When the actor has impaired the condition, quality, or value ofthe chattel, the
actor will be liable only for the harm to a materially valuable interest in the
physical condition, the quality, or the value of the chattel.' Unlike a trespass
to real property, the law does not provide recovery for nominal damages when
Moore v. Regents of University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 493-97 (Cal. 1990), which found
that a doctor was not liable for conversion when the doctor had harvested cells from patient's
body without informing the patient.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(b) (1965).
147. See id. § 217 cmt. e (explaining trespass as either act that brings actor into physical
contact with chattel in possession of another or act that results in directing object at chattel in
possession of another).
148. See id. § 217 cmt. c (explaining character of intent necessary to maintain action for
trespass to chattels). Knowledge as to any interference with the possessory right of another is
not necessary. Id.
149. See id. §§ 218 cmt. b, 252 & cmt. b (explaining that if actor has consent from owner
then actor will not be liable for trespass to chattels).
150. See id. § 252 cmt. c (observing that possessors of chattel may limit consent to specific
time, place or other condition of use); id. § 254 & emt. a (stating that possessor may terminate
actor's privilege to intermeddle with chattel in question).
151. See id. § 252 cmt. c (stating that acting outside scope of limited privilege that posses-
sor has granted may result in liability for harm to chattel).
152. See id. §§ 259-278 (discussing privileges that might protect actor from liability for
use of chattel of another).
153. See id. § 259 (providing for privilege of use of public utility); id. § 260 (providing for
privilege of defense of land or chattels); id. § 261 (providing privilege for defending self or third
person); id. § 262 (providing privilege for acts done because of public necessity).
154. See id. § 218 cmt. e (stating that possessor must show actor caused actual harm).
155. Id. An actor also can be liable for harm that arises if the actor dispossesses the pos-
sessor of the chattel, deprives the possessor of use of the chattel for a substantial time, or if
bodily harm comes to the possessor or a person or thing in which that possessor has a legally
protected interest. Id. § 218(a), (c)-(d).
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the intermeddling with the chattel is harmless. 156 Furthermore, the possessor
has a privilege to use reasonable force to protect a chattel from harmless
interference. 7 Thus, the law reasons, the privilege to use reasonable force
provides the possessor with sufficient legal protection of the interest in the
personal property.
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Several cases have established and confirmed that electronic signals are
physical contacts sufficient to give rise to a claim for trespass to chattels.159
Thus, when an actor has sent an unwanted e-mail or other electronic signal to
a network, ISPs or other computer network owners can overcome the initial
requirement that an actor has intermeddled with the chattel. The more diffi-
cult hurdle involves proving the damages to the computer network owner's
interest in the chattel.
C. Early Application of Trespass to Chattels to Computer Technology
Analogizing invasions of computer systems to trespass to chattels has its
origins in the 1996 California case of Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek.'" In
Thrifty-Tel, two minors used computer technology and stolen codes to access
the plaintiff's telephone system in order to make unauthorized long-distance
telephone calls.16' The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District
determined that the minors' acts constituted a trespass to personal property,
or chattels. 62 At the trial court, the plaintiff in Thrifty-Tel originally won on
156. Id. § 218 cmt. e. The Restatement gives the example of the child who pulls a dog's
ears. In such a case, the child has done no harm to the dog or to a legally protected interest of
the owner. Id. § 218 cmt e, illus. 2. Thus, the actor is not liable to the owner of the dog. Id.
That the law does not protect the owner's interest in the mere inviolability of a chattel is in
contrast to the law's protection of a land-owner's interest in the mere inviolability of the land.
Id. § 218 cmt e.
157. See id. §§ 77, 218 cmt. e (explaining that possessor of chattel has privilege to use
reasonable force to protect interest in inviolability of chattel as against another person).
158. See id. (stating that privilege to use reasonable force to protect chattels provides
sufficient protection interest in inviolability of chattel).
159. See America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (ED. Va. 1998) (stating
that unauthorized sending of bulk commercial e-mail constituted trespass to chattels); Compu-
Serve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (stating that
electronic signals or messages provide sufficient contact to give rise to action for trespass to
chattels); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468,473 n.6 (CL App. 1996) (conclud-
ing that electronic signals generated by computers that minors used to access plaintiff's
telephone system were sufficiently tangible to maintain action for trespass to personal property).
160. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996).
161. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468,471 (Ct. App. 1996) (describ-
ing minors' activities).
162. See id. (concluding that use of computer technology to access confidential authoriza-
tion codes for plaintiff's telephone system constituted trespass to personal property). The court
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a claim for conversion of personal property.163 The defendant appealed."M
The appellate court reversed the trial court and found that the plaintiff had
failed to prove conversion because the minors did not interfere with or take
a tangible interest.'" Instead of conversion, the court found that the plaintiff
had successfully proved trespass to personal property, or chattels." The
court stated that the electronic signals that the minors' activities generated
were sufficiently tangible to support the trespass to chattels cause of action.'
concluded that computer-generated electronic signals could give rise to a cause of action for and
did support liability for trespass to chattels. Id. In Thrifty-Tel, the defendants challenged the
trial court's ruling that the minor children of the defendants had committed conversion. Id. at
472. The trial court found that the children had made unauthorized use of confidential codes
to gain computer access to the plaintiff's telephone system. Id. at 471. The children then
searched the system for authorization codes to allow them to place long distance telephone calls
over the plaintiff's telephone system. Id. On the first occasions, the minors made manual
searches of the system, and on subsequent occasions they used computer programs for between
six and seven hours to search the system, generating over one thousand phone calls on plain-
tiff's telephone system. Id. The automated calling overburdened the Thrifty-Tel system and
disrupted access for some subscribers. Id. The appellate court agreed with defendants that,
traditionally, courts do not recognize conversion when there has been an unauthorized taking
of intangible interests that are not merged with or reflected in something tangible. Id. at 472.
The court, however, determined that Thrifty-Tel had pleaded and proved a cause of action for
trespass to personal property, or chattels. Id. at 473. The court said that trespass to chattels lies
when "an intentional interference with personal property has proximately caused injury." Id.
Thus, although there was no cause for conversion, the use of the computer access and authoriza-
tion codes and the tie-up of Thrifty-Tel's system constituted a trespass. Id.
163. See id. at 471 (stating that plaintiff prevailed in lower court on theories of conversion
and fraud). The defendant challenged the ruling in the lower court on the grounds that the
underlying facts did not support these determinations. Id.
164. Id
165. See id. at 472 (agreeing that conversion did not apply to plaintiff's cause of action
because defendants did not interfere with tangible interest or with intangible interest that was
merged with or reflected in tangible interest). The court made the point that conversion will lie
even when a defendant interferes with an intangible interest as long as the interest is merged
with a tangible interest Id. The court gave the example of a stock certificate, the value of
which is not the tangible cost of the paper, but the intangible worth of the stock. Id.
166. See id. at 472-73 (stating that although plaintiff failed to prove conversion, court
could use its recognized power to modify decision below to conclude that plaintiff had pleaded
and proved claim for trespass to personal property). Furthermore, at trial, the defendants
virtually conceded that the minors had trespassed. Id. at 472.
167. See id. at 472 n.6 (discussing relaxation of tangibility requirement). The court
explained that although the old rule required physical touching of a tangible chattel, the more
modem approach allows for an "indirect touching." Id. For example, dust particles or even
microscopic particles may give rise to a cause of action for trespass, assuming that there is some
actual physical harm to the property. Id. (citations omitted). The Restatement (Second) of Torts
explains that "'intermeddling' means intentionally bringing about a physical contact with the
chattel." RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965). Regardless of the relaxation of the
physical contact aspects of intermeddling, the Thrifty-Tel court decided that the electronic
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In the damages portion of the opinion, the court determined that Thrifty-
Tel had failed to mitigate its damages when it had the opportunity to do so and
that Thrifty-Tel had failed to establish actual damages."e The court rejected
Thrifty-Tel's production of a statistical formula for damages reasoning that
the use of statistical averaging could present a windfall to the plaintiff.'69
Furthermore, statistical averaging would not reflect the fact that some com-
puter hacking170 activities might only result in de minimis damages.1 1'
A significant result of Thrifty-Tel is its recognition of electronic signals
as being sufficiently physical to give rise to a cause of action for trespass to
chattels." 2 Equally significant was the Thrifty-Tel court's recognition that
not all computer hacking will give rise to an action for trespass to chattels;
the court reaffirmed the notion that a claim for trespass to chattels will not be
successful when the alleged damage is de minimis.' 7 ' Thus, to recover for
harm arising from an intrusion into a proprietary computer network, a plain-
tiff must show that the electronic intrusion actually caused some measurable
harm.'74 Thrifty-Tel is significant because in using the common law to
respond to changing technology, Thrifty-Tel affirmed the notion that the
common law can be responsive and flexible in the face of changing tech-
nology.
175
signals that the minors' activities generated were sufficient to constitute a trespass. Thrifty-Tel,
54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 n.6.
168. See Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474-75 (explaining that plaintiff failed to mitigate
damages and failed to establish any actual harm). As a result ofthe failure to mitigate, the court
determined that the plaintiffs could not recover for damages arising from any of the hacking
after the first incident Id. at 474.
169. See id. at 475 (determining that statistical formula for average damages suffered by
plaintiffwas not appropriate measure of damages because formula might give plaintiff windfall).
170. See THE AMEbCAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1996) (defining "hacker" as "one
who illegally gains access to or enters another's electronic system to obtain secret information
or steal money").
171. See Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475 (commenting that computer hacker activities
vary as to amount of damages they might cause).
172. See id. at 473 n.6 (stating that electronic signals were sufficiently tangible to permit
cause of action for trespass to chattels).
173. See id. at 475 (commenting that computer hacker activities vary as to amount of
damages they might cause).
174. See id. at 474-75 (establishing that failure to prove actual harm would preclude
recovery under trespass to chattels theory).
175. See id. at 473-74 (commenting on applying common law to modem facts); see also
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(relying on Thrifty-Tel for support in finding electronic signals sufficient for trespass to chattels
action). See generally Keller, supra note 70 (commenting on inadequacy of statutory regimes
for regulating Intemet and suggesting that common law provides best option for protecting
interests as new technology develops).
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D. Application of Trespass to Chattels to E-Mail and ISPs:
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.
Using Thrifty-Tel's determination that electronic signals can give rise to
a cause of action for trespass to chattels," 6 an ISP brought atrespass to chattels
theory claim against a spammer."' In CompuServe, Inc. v. CyberPromotions,
Inc.," '8 the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
granted a preliminary injunction to stop an Internet advertiser from sending
bulk unsolicited commercial e-mail to the ISP's customers. 79 The case began
when Cyber Promotions sent numerous unsolicited commercial e-mail mes-
sages to CompuServe's customers. 8 CompuServe's customers complained
to the ISP, with some even threatening to leave CompuServe for another
ISP.'5 CompuServe notified Cyber Promotions to stop sending e-mail over
CompuServe's proprietary computer system."m Cyber Promotions responded
by sending increasing volumes of the unsolicited advertisements. 3 Compu-
Serve then attempted to block the incoming e-mail with software programs
designed to filter out unwanted e-mail.1 84 In turn, Cyber Promotions modified
176. See America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating
that unauthorized sending of bulk commercial e-mail constituted trespass to chattels); Compu-
Serve, 962 F. Supp. at 1021 (stating that electronic signals or messages provide sufficient
contact to give rise to action for trespass to chattels); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr.
2d 468, 473 n.6 (Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that computer-generated electronic signals used
to access plaintiff's telephone system were sufficiently tangible to maintain action for trespass
to personal property).
177. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1017 (agreeing that CompuServe could maintain
action for trespass to chattels against online advertiser); see also supra Part IVA (describing
problem of spaie).
178. 962F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
179. See CompuServe, Inc. v. CyberPromotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015,1028 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (granting plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction).
180. See id. at 1017 (stating that defendant Cyber Promotions's business is to send hun-
dreds of thousands of advertisements to Internet users by e-mail and that many Internet users
are clients of CompuServe's). CompuServe is a commercial ISP that offers its service through
its own proprietary computer network. Id. After connecting to CompuServe's network, a
customer can connect to the wider resources ofthe Internet Id.; see supra Part ]ILB (explaining
how ISPs provide connections to Internet).
181. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1019 (stating that CompuServe had received many
complaints from its customers about e-mail advertisements that defendant sent out and stating
that some customers had threatened to discontinue service with CompuServe because of large
amount of bulk commercial e-mail).
182. See id. (explaining that CompuServe had demanded that Cyber Promotions cease and
desist from sending further e-mail to CompuServe's customers).
183. See idL (stating that Cyber Promotions responded to demands to cease and desist from
sending bulk commercial e-mail by sending large volume of additional e-mail).
184. See id. (explaining that CompuServe attempted to block bulk e-mail from Cyber Pro-
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its own software and equipment to circumvent CompuServe's efforts to block
the e-mail.'
85
Failing in its self-help efforts, CompuServe obtained atemporary restrain-
ing order.'86 CompuServe then pursued a preliminary injunction based on the
common-law theory of trespass to chattels.' s In granting CompuServe's
motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court first observed that tres-
pass to chattels was in fact an actionable tort." 8 The court found that elec-
tronic signals are "sufficiently physically tangible" to support a trespass
action. 89 Furthermore, the court stated that either harm to the personal
property or diminution of its value, quality, or condition would be an adequate
predicate to liability." The court then observed that a plaintiff who pursues
motions); see also Pritchard, supra note 73, at 243 (stating that one response to unwanted e-
mail is to block or "kill" incoming, unwanted files).
185. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1019 (describing how Cyber Promotions responded
to CompuServe's use of filtering software by modifying its messages to evade detection by
CompuServe's software).
186. See id. at 1019-20 (addressing perpetuating temporary restraining order issued in early
part of action).
187. See id. at 1020 (continuing temporaryrestraining order and examining CompuServe's
motion for injunction, predicated on common law theory of trespass to chattels against Cyber
Promotions's sending unsolicited advertisements to e-mail addresses of any of CompuServe's
customers).
188. See id. at 1021 (canvassing Ohio case law and secondary sources to find that trespass
to chattels is actionable tort in Ohio).
189. See id, (stating that other courts have held that computer-generated and dissem-
inated electronic signals are sufficiently physically tangible to support action for trespass to
chattels). The court cited Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996),
which applies the trespass theory to damages arising from a defendant's computer hacking. In
Washington v. Riley, 846 P.2d 1365,1373 (Wash. 1993), the court found that, under Washing-
ton law, computer hacking was the criminal offense of "computer trespass." In Indiana v.
McGraw, 480 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind. 1985), the court recognized in dictum that a computer
hacker's unauthorized access to a computer network was akin to trespass. Arguably, the Riley
and McGraw cases are distinguishable from the CompuServe case because the first two involve
criminal charges under state statutory law. Riley, 846 P.2d at 1368; McGraw, 480 N.E.2d at
552. However, these distinctions are not as important as the recognition by the Indiana and
Washington courts that computer or electronic signals can give rise to causes of action, whether
criminal or civil.
190. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022 (explaining that plaintiff can maintain action
for trespass to chattels absent interference with right to possess chattel if it can show harm to
personal property or diminution in property's value, quality, or condition as result of defen-
dant's use). The court based its reasoning on the Restatement (Second) of Torts which lays out
one of the circumstances under which a person who commits a trespass to chattel may be liable
to the chattel's possessor. Id. at 1021-22; RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 218(b) (1965).
The Restatement states that "[t]here may... be situations in which the value to the owner of a
particular type of chattel may be impaired by [the defendant's] dealing with it in a manner that
does not affect its physical condition." Id. § 218 cmt. h.
239
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an action for trespass to chattels must show intent and actual damages in order
to proceed with the claim."'
To prove intent, a plaintiff can show that it gave the defendant actual
notice that the defendant was not permitted on the plaintiff's property.'92
Because CompuServe explicitly told Cyber Promotions that Cyber Promotions
did not have CompuServe's consent to use CompuServe's system, Compu-
Serve could clearly prove intent.93 Additionally, CompuServe obviated any
defense based on consent because it never expressly granted Cyber Promo-
tions the privilege to use CompuServe's resources. 94 Any initial consent
Cyber Promotions may have had by virtue of CompuServe's connection to the
Internet vanished, in the court's view, when CompuServe unequivocally told
Cyber Promotions to stop using the CompuServe network.9"
In assessing whether CompuServe had demonstrated actual damages
sufficient to support a preliminary injunction, the court reasoned that Compu-
Serve had succeeded in showing that potential actual damages arose from the
191. See CompuServe, Inc. v. CyberPromotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015,1023 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (explaining that tort of trespass to chattels requires some actual damage as prima facie
element); id. at 1024 (stating that plaintiffs must prove that would-be trespasser acted with
intent in order to prove liability for trespass).
192. See id. at 1024 (stating that plaintiffs can prove intent necessary to sustain action for
trespass by demonstrating that plaintiff gave defendant actual notice that plaintiff would not
permit defendant to use plaintiff's property). The court observed that CompuServe's use-policy
expressly prohibits use of CompuServe's facilities for sending unsolicited e-mail messages. Id
Although the statement of this policy on the Internet might be insufficient notice to potential
third-party users, the court stated that it was not concerned with that risk in this case. Id.
193. See id. (explaining that CompuServe employee specifically told owner of Cyber Pro-
motions that it could not use any of CompuServe's equipment to send junk e-mail).
194. See id. at 1023-24 (explaining defense of privilege granted by owner of chattels and
fact that CompuServe explicitly had denied any such privilege).
195. See id. (explaining that property owner can rescind consent to use by third party and
that any use after recission is trespass and explaining that CompuServe did rescind any privilege
that might have existed by virtue of CompuServe's connection to Internet). The court also
addressed whether Cyber Promotions might have a special privilege to use CompuServe's
system under common carrier or public utility theories. Id. at 1025. Although Cyber Promo-
tions did not advance this argument, the court addressed and then dismissed such an argument
Id. To determine whether an entity is a public utility, the court engaged in a multi-step analysis.
Id. First, the entity must devote a service or good to the use of the general public. Id. Second,
the general public must also have a legal right to demand or to receive the service or good. Id.
Last, a public utility must also conduct its business as a matter of public concern, such as a
monopoly or oligopoly. Id. (citing A&B Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. Board of Ravenna Township
Trustees, 596 N.E.2d 423, 425-26 (Ohio 1992)). But see Goldstone, supra note 84, at 40-47
(explaining how courts and regulators could apply general common carrier principles to ISPs
and how applying those principles could help message senders); Note, The Message in the
Medium: The First.Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062,
1064-67 (1994) (suggesting ways in which computer networks are like common carriers).
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drain that Cyber Promotions's large amount of e-mail put on CompuServe's
computer disk space and power.19 Because of the spamming, CompuServe's
resources were not available to its subscribers."9 As a result, CompuServe's
business reputation and goodwill with customers suffered potential harm." '
Based on the difficulty of quantifying CompuServe's harm, the court deter-
mined that a preliminary injunction was an appropriate interim measure to
protect CompuServe from possible additional harm."
In the court's final balancing between the harm to the plaintiff and the
harm to the defendant, the court concluded that the harm to CompuServe
outweighed any harm Cyber Promotions might suffer from the issuance of a
preliminary injunction.2"c The court decided, as a matter of public policy, that
it was best to protect the common-law rights of property owners." 1 The court
found that ifthe defendant were to prevail on its First Amendment defense,2"
the resulting high volumes ofjunk e-mail would most likely harm the viability
of e-mail as an effective communication system.2 3
Inthe Thrfty-Tel and CompuServe decisions, the courts present an inter-
esting application of old lawto a new situation.' However, by employing the
196. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022 (acknowledging CompuServe's affidavit stating
that handling large volume of bulk e-mail had drained CompuServe computer resources and thus
resulted in diminution of value of computer equipment).
197. See id. (stating that result ofCyber Promotions's e-mail messages was to make Compu-
Serve's network unavailable to its customers).
198. See id. (stating that result of Cyber Promotions's bulk e-mail was to diminish avail-
able resources for CompuServe customers).
199. See id. at 1027-28 (stating that plaintiff had shown that defendant's intrusions into
plaintiff's computer system resulted in harm to plaintiff's business reputation and goodwill
which was intangible loss that preliminary injunction would mitigate).
200. See id. at 1028 (concluding that plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm without
injunction and that defendant would not suffer because it could employ alternative means to
disseminate its message).
201. Id.
202. See id. at 1025-27 (discussing defendant's attempt to use First Amendment as
defense). The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the court observed that
CompuServe was a private company and did not exercise any traditional state functions, and
thus, it was not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 1026-27. Second, the court stated
that because Cyber Promotions's acts exceeded any consent that CompuServe granted, the First
Amendment could not provide Cyber Promotions a defense. Id. at 1027.
203. Id. at 1028. In determiningthatthe harmtothe defendantwas notsignificant, the court
stated that "[h]igh volumes of junk e-mail devour computer processing and storage capacity,
slow down data transfer between computers over the Internet by congesting the electronic paths
through which the messages travel, and cause recipients to spend time and money wading
through messages that they do not want" Id. The court also observed that if customers of
CompuServe do not like this order, the customers can choose another ISP that accepts spain. Id.
204. See Bennett, supra note 141, at 560-63 (addressing definition of trespass to chattels
in cyberspace); Hawley, supra note 141, at 392-96 (commenting on use of trespass to chattels
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trespass to chattels theory, the courts limited the possibility that the owner of
a private computer or e-mail system can protect itself from trespasses to its
property."' The question remains whether these cases present a new para-
digm by which to judge all cases involving unsolicited e-mail or whether the
Thrifty-Tel and CompuServe cases are limited to their facts. The Intel case
provides an interesting context in which to analyze these issues.
V Protecting Private Network Providers from Unwanted E-Mail
Although the Intel case and the commercial ISP cases appear similar, the
cases implicate different issues with respect to the harm to the plainfiffs'
property interests.' 6 The factual distinctions make it apparent that trespass
to chattels will not adequately protect Intel's interest in its private network."
Trespass to chattels requires that a plaintiff prove that it has suffered tangible
harm.2"s It may be difficult for a private network provider to prove it has
suffered tangible harm while it is still suffering intangible harm.2"9 Thus, if
Intel and other private network providers are to protect their interests, they
will need to find another theory.210 A limited expansion of the protections
afforded in cases of trespass to real property will most effectively protect a
private network provider's interest because the private network provider may
obtain relief when the harm is merely nominal.211 The following ubparts
detail the limitations of the trespass to chattels theory and the alternative
limited analogy to trespass to real property.
21 2
to protect ISPs' and consumers' interests). See generally Mark D. Robins, Electronic Tres-
pass: An Old Theory in a New Context, 15 No. 7 CoMPUTER LAW. 1 (1998) (discussing appli-
cation of old common law theory to electronic contacts resulting in trespass to chattels)
205. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 158 (1965) (holding actor liable for
trespass irrespective of harm to land of another) with RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) TORTS § 218(b)-
(c) & cmt e (1965) (stating that actor is liable for trespass to chattels only if trespass results in
actual harm).
206. See infra Part V.B (distinguishing harm to Intel from harm to ISPs).
207. See infra Part VA-B (explaining Intel facts and how trespass to chattels will not ade-
quately protect interests).
208. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (explaining tangibility requirement
for succeeding on trespass to chattels claim).
209. See infra notes 246-53 (providing examples of intangible harm that private network
providers might suffer if unable to stem tide of unsolicited e-mail).
210. See inffra Part V.B-C (suggesting that alternative theory to trespass to chattels is nec-
essary).
211. See infra Part V.C (discussing use of limited trespass to land claims to protect private
network provider's interests).
212. See infra Part VA-C (detailing why trespass to chattels is insufficient to protect
private network providers and explaining how and why limiting trespass to real property would
provide effective remedy for trespass to computer networks).
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A. Factual Background of Intel v. Hamidi
As discussed in Part I, a former employee of computer-chip giant Intel
has used a Web page and e-mail to spread his message condemning Intel's
employment practices.213 In response to perceived abuses by Intel against its
employees, a former Intel employee, Ken Hamidi, and other former Intel
employees created a group named AXEI, now named FACE Intel.214 Hamidi,
the group's spokesperson and contact, states that the group's primary purpose
is to challenge Intel's personnel policies and to promote long-term employ-
ment possibilities at Intel.2"5 FACE Intel spreads its message of opposition to
Intel's personnel policies through its Web site and by sending mass e-mail
messages to current Intel employees. 1 6
FACE Intel sent its first mass e-mail to Intel employees in December
1996, with follow-up e-mail messages in March and April of 1997.211 The
group sent more e-mail in February and March of 1998.21 In spring 1998,
Intel asked Hamidi and FACE Intel to return its list of Intel employee e-mail
addresses and demanded that Hamidi cease and desist from sending any addi-
tional e-mail over the Intel computer system, including the company e-mail
system.21 '9 Responding to Intel's request, Hamidi claimed that he and other
213. See supra Part I (discussing background giving rise to Intel v. HamidO.
214. See Complaint, supra note 9 (explaining origins of FACE Intel); Intel's Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at I (explaining background on source of e-mail from FACE
Intel); see also FACE Intel (visited Jan. 14, 2000) <http'J/www.faceintel.com/whowearehtm>
(explaining acronym, purpose of group, and setting forth FACE Intel's grievances against
company). The acronym FACE Intel stands for Former and Current Employees of Intel. Id.
Specifically, FACE Intel claims that Intel engages in age discrimination, medical disability
discrimination, and race and ancestry discrimination. Id. Further, FACE Intel takes issue with
the termination procedures that Intel follows. Id. Hamidi himself is a former employee who
lost his position after a protracted battle over disability benefits. See Rita Ciolli, Web as
Weapon: Victims of Online Attacks Seek Limitsfor New Medium, NEWSDAY, Feb. 15, 1999,
atA5 (providing background on Hamidi's dispute with Intel).
215. See FACE Intel (visited Jan. 14, 2000) <http'/www.faceintel.com/whoweare.htm>
("FACE Intel Group Mission: To influence positive human resources policies and practices and
create true long-term employment opportunities at Intel"); see also Intel's Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 8, at 1 (stating that Hamidi has identified himself as officer and desig-
nated spokesman for FACE Intel).
216. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 1 (explaining what activ-
ities FACE Intel engages in to spread its message).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Letter from Morrison & Foerster, Intel's attorneys, to Ken Hamidi and FACE
Intel 1-2 (Mar. 17, 1998) (located at Intel v. Hamidi (visited Jan. 14, 2000) <http'l/www.
Intelhamidi.comfmtelleters.htm>) [hereinafter Morrison Letter] (telling Hamidi, as FACE Intel
contact person, that FACE Intel illegally was using Intel employee addresses and that FACE
Intel was trespassing on Intel's proprietary computer system, and that if FACE Intel did not stop
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members of FACE Intel had compiled the employee lists from their own labor,
and thus the lists were not property of Intel.Y Hamidi further asserted that
the First Amendment protects the transmission of e-mail over the Internet.12
Despite Intel's request, Hamidi did not stop; rather, he sent another bulk e-
mail in September 19 98 .'
After Hamidi's refusal to comply with Intel's request, Intel filed suit on
October 7, 1998 in Sacramento Superior Court against Kenneth Hamidi and
FACE Intel, alleging trespass to chattels and nuisance.' On November 27,
1998, the California Superior Court granted Intel a preliminary injunction.224
The order prohibited Hamidi from sending any further e-mail to Intel employ-
ees over Intel's computer network.' On June 17, 1999, the court entered a
permanent injunction in favor of Intel;" the question that arises now is
whether the court properly based its decision on trespass to chattels or if the
court should have found a slightly different basis for the ruling.' Intel then
immediately, Intel would take court action). Intel has dropped any claims with respect to the
employee lists. Compare Morrison Letter, supra, at 1 (stating that employees lists are property
of Intel) with Complaint, supra note 9 (making no mention of employee lists).
220. See Letter from Ken Hamidi, FACE Intel Spokesperson, to Linda E. Shostak, Morri-
son & Foerster, Intel's attorneys I (Jan. 14, 2000) (located at Intel v. Hamidi (visited Oct. 28,
1999) <http://www.Intelhamidi.comintefletters.htm>) [hereinafter Hamidi's Letter] (arguing
that fists cannot be proprietary information of Intel because FACE Intel members compiled the
lists with their own labor).
221. See Hamidi's Letter, supra note 220, at 1 (stating that sending e-mail is merely use
of Internet to exercise free speech rights).
222. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 1 (detailing events leading
to filing of complaint against Hamidi and FACE Intel); see also Intel v. Hamidi (visited Jan. 14,
2000) <http://www.Intelhamidi.com/septembermail.htm> (containing text of FACE Intel
September e-mail).
223. Complaint, supra note 9, at 4-12, 14-15.
224. See Preliminary Injunction, supra note 17 (granting preliminary injunction until final
judgment after trial on merits). Although this Note argues that a limited application of trespass
to real property provides a better basis for a permanent injunction than does a trespass to chattels
claim, it is not unreasonable that the court granted the preliminary and permanent injunctions on
the basis of the trespass to chattels theory. The ISP cases and the Intel case are sufficiently
analogous that upon first viewing they appear identical. However, after further examination of
the factual distinctions, it becomes apparent that the Intel case and the ISP cases are distinguish-
able such that a different theory should have been necessary for Intel to prevail. See infra Part
V.B (distinguishing Intel facts from facts of cases in which ISPs won on trespass to chattels
claims).
225. See Preliminary Injunction, supra note 17 (prohibiting Hamidi or FACE Intel from
sending any unsolicited e-mail or from otherwise using or accessing Intel's computer system).
226. See Order for Entry of Final Judgment, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, No. 98AS05067
(Sacramento Super. Ct. June 16, 1999) (stating that court issued injunction in favor of Intel on
June 16, 1999), available at <http'/lwww.intelhamidi.com/permanentinjunction.htm#Order for
entry of final judgment>.
227. See infra Part V.3-C (analyzing Intel's trespass to chattels claim and suggesting
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won a permanent injunction against Hamidi and FACE Intel on the basis of
trespass to chattels. This Note argues that trespass to chattels is neither the
most accurate nor the most effective basis for this injunction.'
B. Intel's Arguments: How Trespass to Chattels Fails to Protect the
Private Network Provider's Interests
To win summaryjudgment on the trespass to chattels claim, Intel alleged,
relying on Thrifty-Tel and CompuServe, 9 that Hamidi and FACE Intel tres-
passed on Intel's proprietary computer system by sending unauthorized and
unwelcome e-mail to addresses on the system." ° These cases support the
alternative theory of recovery). Hamidi also has suggested in several places that he believes that
the First Amendment protects his right to send e-mail to Intel over their system, and thus, an
injunction would be impermissible. See Hamidi's Letter, supra note 220, at 1; Ken Hamidi, Intel
v. Hamidi (visited Jan. 14,2000) <http:/iwww.Intelhamidi.com/casedocuments.htm> (explaining
that Hamidi regards lawsuit as question of protecting First Amendment right of free speech).
This defense did not prevail at the superior court level. Arguably, those who send a large amount
of unsolicited e-mail could claim First Amendment protection based either on the public forum
doctrine or on the state action doctrine. However, a discussion of the First Amendment is
beyond the scope of this Note. Various commentators have addressed First Amendment issues
with respect to the Internet See generally JONATHANW. EMORDFREEDOM, TECHNOLOGYAND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991); Goldstone, supra note 84 (discussing application of public
forum doctrine in cyberspace); Allen S. Hammond, Private Networks, Public
Speech: ConstitutionalSpeech Dimensions ofAccess to Private Networks, 55 U. Prir. L. REV.
1085 (1994); Cass RL Sunstein, TheFirstAmendmentin Cybersace, 104YALEL.J. 1757 (1995)
(addressing effect of First Amendment on Internet regulation issues); Eugene Volokh, Cheap
Speech and WhatIt WiiDo, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995) (discussing effect of Internet on free
speech of marginal groups in society). For a discussion of the possible state action argument that
Hamidi could make to protect his acts, see Development III supra note 96, at 1622-34.
228. See infra Part VB-C (distinguishing Intel from other ISP cases and arguing that
distinction makes trespass to chattels inapposite).
229. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 3 (analogizing reasoning
in Thrifty-Tel and CompuServe to support argument that Hamidi's sending e-mail to e-mail
addresses on Intel's network constituted trespass to chattels); supra Part IV.C-D (discussing
Thrifty-Tel and CompuServe cases).
230. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 1-3 (arguing that under
California law, access to proprietary computer system without consent constitutes trespass to
chattels). Intel did not address its nuisance count in its motion for summary judgment. Com-
pare Complaint, supra note 9, at 1114-15 (alleging nuisance) with Intel's Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 8, at 2-4 (failing to address nuisance claim). Nuisance is an action to
recover for a nontrespassory invasion of a possessor's private use and enjoyment of land.
RESTATE MT (SEcoND) TORTS § 821D (1965). In a case of invasion of a private network,
employing a nuisance theory would require an extension of the notions of real property. This
Note does argue for extending the notions of property in order to allow the same protection for
network trespasses that land trespasses receive. See infra Part V.C. However, even if courts
extend real property notions, the specific theory of nuisance will not protect the private network
provider as well as trespass to land will protect the private network provider. To succeed on a
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notion that use of another's computer system can constitute a trespass to chat-
tels, but are distinguishable from the Intel case.2
31
Analyzing Intel under atrespass to chattels theory demonstrates that Intel
should not have been able to prove the actual harm requirement for relief, and
thus, Intel should have failed in its trespass to chattels claim against Hamidi.1 2
To succeed on trespass to chattels, Intel first had to establish that Hamidi had
in fact intermeddled with the chattel. 3 Intel could demonstrate the physical
contact requirement of intermeddling because Hamidi's contact with Intel's
computer system was via e-mail, and courts already have established that
electronic signals are sufficiently tangible to support an action for trespass."'
Intel could prove the next key requirement, the intent to intermeddle with the
property in question, through Hamidi's own admissions."5  For example, in
his letter responding to Intel's demand to cease sending any e-mail over the
Intel computer network, Hamidi said that in sending the e-mail, he was exer-
cising his "free speech rights ... on the Intemet."u23 Furthermore, Intel's
notice to Hamidi that Intel no longer would allow him to send e-mail on the
Intel system revoked any implied consent to use the Intel system that arises
from Intel's connection to the Intemet. 7
nuisance claim, the plaintiff would have to show that the intentional acts of the defendant were
unreasonable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 822(a) (1965). To be unreasonable, the
defendant's acts must cause grave harm that outweighs the utility of the defendant's acts, or the
defendant's acts must cause harm that is serious, monetarily compensable and compensability
would not make continuation of the defendant's acts unfeasible. Id. § 826. Trespass, in con-
trast, does not require a showing of such grave harm because it protects the possessor's interest
in the inviolability of the land in question; thus, any entry upon the land could subject an actor
to liability. Id. § 821D cmt d. In the context of the invasion of an interest in a computer
network, nuisance would not permit recovery when the plaintiff could not show serious harm.
Id. §§ 822, 826; see also supra Part IV.C (explaining necessity of showing harm in action for
trespass to chattels).
231. See infra notes 222-37 and accompanying text (distinguishing ISP cases from Intel
case).
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 218 cmt e (1965) (requiring showing ofactual
harm to recover for trespass to chattels).
233. See supra Part IV.B (discussing elements of trespass to chattels).
234. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015,1021 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (stating that electronic signals from computers are sufficient to support action for trespass
to chattels); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468,473 n.6 (Ct. App. 1996) (same);
supra Part IV.C-D (developing use oftrespass to chattels in electronic context).
235. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 1 (stating that Hamidi has
admitted to at least three of mass e-mail messages that Intel has received); see also Hamidi's
Letter, supra note 220, at 1 (denying that e-mail constituted spare or that FACE Intel or Hamidi
has trespassed on Intel's property).
236. Hamidi's Letter, supra note 220, at 1.
237. See Morrison Letter, supra note 219, at 1 (telling Hamidi to cease and desist from
sending any further e-mail on Intel e-mail system); Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment,
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Finally, Intel needed to prove that Hamidi's e-mail contact with Intel's
computers caused actual harm in order to succeed on a trespass to chattels
claim." However, Intel did not allege any specific harm that Hamidi's e-mail
trespasses caused. 9 Intel alleged neither physical harm to the chattel nor
impairment to the value ofthe chattel.240 Instead, Intel attempted to analogize
its harm to the harm that CompuServe suffered at the hands of Cyber Promo-
tions: damage to its goodwill and business reputation.241 However, Intel failed
to explain how Hamidi's e-mail harmed Intel's business in the same way that
Cyber Promotions's e-mail damaged CompuServe's business. 242 As the court
in CompuServe explained, CompuServe derives value from its network, wholly
to the extent that CompuServe's computer equipment can serve the subscriber
base.243 Intel did not show that Hamidi's e-mail drained Intel's computer
resources so as to deprive paying customers of access to a service that Intel
offers.24' Furthermore, because Intel does not offer e-mail or network services
to outside parties, it could not have suffered loss of goodwill from customers
supra note 8, at 1 (referencing letter, from lawyers, informing Hamidi that Intel expressly pro-
hibited Hamidi from sending e-mail to Intel).
238. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of showing
of actual damages in order to find actor liable for trespass to chattels).
239. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 1-5. At no point in its
Motion for Summary Judgment does Intel explain what actual damages it has suffered because
of Hamidi's e-mail messages. Id.
240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 218 cmt h (1965) (commenting that harm to
chattel may be physical harm or dealing with chattel so as to impair its value, irrespective of
actual physical harm). The Restatement uses the example of a toothbrush. Id. If an actor uses
the toothbrush of another, the actor's use has not physically destroyed or damaged the tooth-
brush. Id. However, the owner may not want to use the toothbrush again, and thus, the actor's
use has rendered the toothbrush virtually useless to the owner. Id.
241. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 2-3 (citing to harm that
CompuServe suffered as result of spare sent over its system). Intel does not support its implica-
tion of equivalent harm with similar evidence of the equivalent harm. In CompuServe, the ISP
could demonstrate that customers had threatened to discontinue service and that the volume of
spain had significantly affected the availability of service to the ISP's customers. CompuServe,
Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019, 1022, 1027-28 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
Thus, the court determined that CompuServe had suffered harm to its goodwill and reputation.
Id. at 1021-22.
242. Compare Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 1-3 (referencing
CompuServe's harm but failing to comment upon actual harm that Intel suffered) with Compu-
Serve, 962 F. Supp. at 1022-23 (explaining harm that CompuServe has suffered to its business
reputation and goodwill as result of Cyber Promotions's e-mail messages).
243. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022 (explaining source of value for CompuServe's
computer systems).
244. See id. at 1022-23 (explaining that Cyber Promotions's e-mail harmed business repu-
tation and goodwill by depriving CompuServe's customers of use of CompuServe's service).
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who are paying for its service.2 45 Although Hamidi successfully contacted
approximately 29,000 Intel employees, this number does not compare to the
millions of e-mail messages that spammers have sent to ISPs' subscribers.246
Ultimately, failure to allege orto support a showing of actual harm should have
precluded Intel from prevailing on a trespass to chattels theory.247
Although the court should have found that Intel lacked sufficient evi-
dence to succeed on a trespass to chattels theory, this lack of evidence does
not reflect an absence of harm to Intel. Hamidi's continuing e-mail intruded
upon Intel's network and affected other interests that Intel has in its network.
As information and its transmission have become economically more valu-
able,248 private individuals and corporate entities have pursued their own
interests in appropriating the value of information to their own use.249 Such
appropriations of value include, but are not limited to, the creation of the
physical computer networks and Internet connections." ° Intel is certainly no
exception. Intel's network serves its corporate purposes by providing its
employees a medium by which to work more efficiently, researching and
communicating more rapidly."' Furthermore, Intel has exercised exclusive
245. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 4 (stating that Intel e-mail
system is not open to use by members of general public and that Intel limits employees' per-
sonal use).
246. Compare Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that
Hamidi's most recent e-mail reached approximately 29,000 employees), with America Online,
Inc. v. IMS, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that defendant had sent over
60 million pieces of unsolicited bulk e-mail over 10-month period), and Cyber Promotions, Inc.
v. American Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436,438 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that Internet advertiser
had been sending literally millions of e-mail messages to ISP's customers).
247. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (explaining that plaintiff must prove
that it has suffered actual harm in order to recover for trespass to chattels). Even though Intel
prevailed on the trespass to chattels claim, it is not certain that every private network provider
will be able to do so, without rendering meaningless the harm requirement for trespass to
chattels. Thus, an alternative theory of recovery still will be important
248. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing value ofinformation).
249. See McGinnis, supra note 2, at 102 (explaining that exercise of private property rights
of private individuals and corporate entities has propelled growth of "transmission links" and
Internet). For example, ISPs can survive economically because of the increased value that soci-
ety places on the information available through their services. Id. Corporate America also has
demonstrated its belief that telecommunications technology is a necessary element of doing
business. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193,1223 n.122 (1998) (stating thatAmerican corporations have invested more than 50 billion
dollars annually in telecommunications infrastructure).
250. See McGinnis, supra note 2, at 102 (stating that universities have provided employees
with Internet links with hope that university ultimately will derive benefit from employees' use
of Interet).
251. See ACLU , 929 F. Supp. 824, 832-33 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that employers often
provide Internet connections to facilitate research and development); see also McGinnis,
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control over the establishment of use policies, evidencing a clear intent to
manage the network resource as its private property. 2 Additionally, Intel has
an important interest in managing more than the physical use of the system,
and thus, Intel defines and limits the use of the network and the permissible
content of e-mails."ss The trespass to chattels theory recognizes and protects
a property interest in the physical functioning of the network. 4 However, a
private network provider's interest in its network is broader than an interest
merely in the network's physical value. Thus, it will be more difficult to
quantify harm in order to prove the actual harm requirement for success on a
trespass to chattels claim. An analogy to trespass to real property, in order
to use the remedies available thereunder, will better protect the broader
interest that a private network provider has in its network because the network
provider will not need to prove actual harm."
C. A Possible Solution for Private Network Providers
Absent actual harm, the trespass to chattels theory fails to and should not
be found to provide sufficient recourse for the private network provider that
wants to rid itself of hostile or unsolicited e-mail. 6 If a private network
supra note 2, at 102 (suggesting that employers obtain benefits of employee connection to
Internet and e-mail); Stephanie Stahl, Dangerous E-mail, INFO. WEEK, Sept 12, 1994, at 12
(explaining that employers provide access to Internet and e-mail for employees to reduce number
of telephone calls, paper memos, and face-to-face meetings). Obviously, Intel's corporate
purposes would not include providing its critics with a forum to express that criticism to current
Intel employees.
252. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that Intel has
established use policies for its computer network); see also 2 WliLAMBLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES 2 (1957) (commenting that nothing causes more debate than right of property); Anthony
M. Honore, Ownership, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, 107,108-124 (A. Guest ed.,
1967) (expressing right to manage as one of rights of ownership of property). In his inimitable
words, Blackstone defines the right of property as "that sole and despotic dominion which one
[person] claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
right of any other individual in the universe." BLACKSTONE, supra, at 2.
253. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that Intel has
established use policies for its computer network); Meyerson, supra note 2, at 140-41 (suggesting
that network owners have right to define use of network); Jarrod J. White, E-mail@Work Com:
EmployerMonitoring ofEmployee E-Mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079,1079-80 (1997) (recognizing
that employers have interest in monitoring employee e-mail in order to protect against liability
and poor productivity).
254. See America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 552 (E.D. Va. 1998) (granting
injunction for trespass to chattels); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1015, 1028 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (same).
255. See inffra Part V.C (applying trespass to land theoryto network trespass).
256. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (explaining that plaintiffcannot recover
for nominal harm in trespass to chattels actions); see also supra Part V.B (explaining that
private network provider may not be able to demonstrate actual harm).
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provider, such as an employer, determines that it does not want to continue
receiving unsolicited bulk e-mail, it has several options. First, it may attempt
to prevent delivery ofthe spammer's e-mails by employing filtering devices.211
Next, it can demand that the spammer cease and desist.25 After exhausting
these self-help methods, seeking judicial help is the only other recourse.2 9
Trespass to chattels provides one legal theory with which to attack
spammers2e However, as discussed above, if the trespass to chattels theory
is imperfect, it may fail to protect the private network provider's broader
interests in its network.261 A trespass to real property theory may provide the
protection that a trespass to chattels theory does not.262  Analogizing the
private network provider's interests to a real property interest would permit
the provider to hold a spammer liable for trespass without necessitating a
demonstration of actual harm.263
257. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1023 (stating that court expects plaintiffs to use
technological self-help measures before resorting to courts to solve spamming issues); Carroll,
supra note 86, at 255-56 (explaining that numerous self-help or "vigilante" mechanisms exist
for ridding Internet of persistent spanmers). Carroll also explains that ISPs attempt to control
sparn both by filtering e-mail with software applications and by establishing use agreements that
make spamming by ISP account holders grounds for terminating the service contract Id. at
256-57.
258. See America Online, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (stating that plaintiff ISP had demanded
that defendant spammer cease sending e-mails over plaintiff's network); CompuServe, 962 F.
Supp. at 1019,1024 (same).
259. See Sorkin, supra note 138, at 1024-27 (discussing inadequacy of most self-help
measures because they allow unwanted messages to slip through and filtering devices often do
not prevent unwanted e-mails from consuming network resources); Hawley, supra note 141, at
411-16 (discussing self-help measures to reduce incidence of spamming and observing that
some efforts are not wholly effective). One problem with filtering, for example, is that it might
filter out desirable e-mail in addition to the unwanted e-mail. Id. at 415-16.
260. See supra Part IV.B-D (setting forth use of trespass to chattels to combat spain).
261. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of trespass to
chattels theory in context of private network provider because of interest in network that is
broader than interest in mere chattel value).
262. See infra notes 263-82 (discussing application of trespass to real property theory to
protect private network provider's interests).
263. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158(a) (1965) (stating that trespasser may
be liable for trespass even if trespasser causes no actual harm to property). Although conversion
might also appear to be a possible action to recover for an interference with possession, conver-
sion will not work in the network trespass cases. The primary distinction between trespass to
chattels and conversion is in the measure of damages. Id. § 222A cmt c. In conversion, the
plaintiff recovers the full value of the chattel. Id. However, a plaintiff can recover only for the
value of the harm in an action for trespass to chattels. Id. Thus, to recover in an action for
conversion, the plaintiff must show that the actor's exercise of dominion or control over the
plaintiff's chattel constituted such a serious and substantial interference with the plaintiff's right
to possession that the plaintiff should recover the chattel's full value. Id. Furthermore, conver-
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Under a taditional trespass to real property theory, an actor maybe liable
for trespass in several situations.2" An actor will be liable for trespass if the
actor intentionally enters land or causes a thing to enter land that is in the
possession of another.26 An actor also will be liable for trespass ifthe actor
intentionally remains on the land in the possession of another after the pos-
sessor has informed the actor that the actor does not have consent to be on the
land." In either situation, the actor will be liable regardless of whether the
actor caused or intended to cause actual harm to the property.267 To prove the
actor's intent to enter or remain on the land, the possessor of the land need
only demonstrate that the actor meant to be present on the land in question;2
the possessor of the land does not have to show that the actor intended any
harm to the land.269 Furthermore, even if the actor mistakenly believes either
that the owner has consented to the actor's entering the land or that a privilege
protects the actor's entry, the actor will be liable for trespassY ° Moreover,
if the owner has consented to the actor's presence on the land, but has since
revoked that consent, then the actor will be liable for any further or continuing
sion's tangibility requirement will preclude recovery when the harm affects an intangible
interest. See W. PAGE KEETONET AL., PRoSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 15, at
90-92 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining tangibility requirement of conversion). Thus, conversion does
not protect intangible interests such as a private network provider might have in controlling the
content that flows to its network. Id.; see also Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d
468,472-73 (Ct. App. 1996) (discussing cases that rejected use of conversion when harm was
to intangible interests).
264. SeeRESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTs § 158 (1965) (setting forthsituationsinwhich
actor will be liable for any intentional intrusion on land).
265. See id. § 158(a) (stating that liability for trespass arises if actor enters land intention-
ally or causes something to enter land). The Restatement uses the example of a sand pile next
to the property boundary line. If the actor piles a sand pile in such a way that the sand slides
onto the neighbor's land, then the actor has committed a trespass. Id. § 158 cmt. e.
266. Id. § 158(b) (explaining that actor is subject to liability for intentionally remaining on
land that is in possession of another).
267. Id. § 163 & cmt. b (explaining liability to possessor for trespass on land even if
presence on land causes no harm to property interest of possessor). Merely acting under
the certainty that one's acts will result in presence on the land will result in liability. Id. § 163
cmt. c.
268. See id. § 163 cmt. b (explaining that intention necessary to make actor liable for
trespass is intention to enter land in question).
269. See id. (explaining that intent means intent to be present on land, not intent to cause
harm). The actor only must have the intent to be on the land, but the intruder does not have to
have the intent to invade the owner's interest in the exclusive possession of the land. Id.
270. See id. § 164 (stating that mistake as to consent or privilege does not relieve actor
from liability for trespass). The Restatement states that mistake as to law or fact will not relieve
the actor of liability for being present on another's land. Id. § 164 cmts. d-e. However, the
Restatement states that if the possessor has induced the actor's belief, then the actor will not be
liable for trespass. Id. § 164 cmt. b.
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entries onto the landY1 In the context of a trespass to a private computer net-
work, the most important aspect of an action for trespass to lands is that the
provider would be able to recover without needing to prove actual hannY2
Analyzing the Intel case under the trespass to land theory demonstrates
how the theory applies to protecting the private network provider's interest. 3
To succeed, Intel first would have had to demonstrate that Hamidi intention-
ally entered or remained on Intel's property, which is Intel's computer net-
work in this case. 4 Although Hamidi did not enter Intel's network himself,
he caused electronic signals to enter the network by sending e-mails to up to
29,000 Intel employees at their Intel e-mail addresses. 27 Intel can prove
Hamidi's intentto enterthe propertybyHamidi's own admissionsY 6 Further-
more, Hamidi has made clear that sending e-mails directly to Intel employees
is one of the methods he and FACE Intel used to attempt to influence Intel
employment policies. 7
271. See id. § 171(b) (explaining that property owner can revoke consent for actor to be
on land).
272. Id. §§ 163, 164 cmt a. Both of these sections indicate that liability for trespass to
land -will arise regardless of the actor's causing harm to the land or its value. Id. The actor's
mere presence on the land will suffice to confer liability. Id.
273. See supra Part VA (discussing facts ofIntel case).
274. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) ToRTS § 158 (1965) (requiring intentional entry to or
remaining on land). Obviously, this analysis assumes that the network provider has an interest
greater than a chattel interest in the network. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text
(examining private network provider's interest). As this Note has discussed, the courts already
have recognized that network providers have a property interest in their networks, as chattel.
See supra Part IV.C-D (discussing application of trespass to chattels theory to trespasses to
computer networks). Although a network is not land in the traditional sense of a plot of earth,
the network provider does have an interest in protecting the network from nonconsensual
invasions. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text (discussing property interest in
computer networks).
275. See RESTATEmENT (S-coND) TORTS § 158 cmt. i (1965) (explaining that actor will
be liable for trespass if actor sends or causes something to enter land in possession of another
or if actor knows that act, to substantial certainty, will result in entry onto property); see also
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(stating that electronic signals from computers are sufficiently physical to support action for
trespass to chattels); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468,473 n.6 (Ct App. 1996)
(same); Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that Hamidi's most
recent e-mail reached approximately 29,000 employees).
276. See Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at I (stating that Hamidi has
admitted to at least three mass e-mailings that Intel has received); see also Hamidi's Letter,
supra note 220, at 1 (denying that e-mails constitute sparn or that FACE Intel or Hamidi has
trespassed on Intel's property); supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text (discussing Intel's
proving Hamidi's intent to have his e-mails reach Intel's computer network).
277. See FACE Intel (visited Jan. 14,2000) <http'/www.faceintel.com/whoweare.htm>
("FACE Intel Group Mission: To influence positive human resources policies and practices and
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A possessor may have consented to the actor's entry on the property.238
However, the possessor can revoke the consent, thus subjecting the actor to
liability for any further entries onto the possessor's land. 9  Hamidi has
argued that Intel's connection to the Internet constitutes implied consent to
use the Intel network to e-mail Intel employees." Assuming implied consent
existed, Intel expressly revoked its consent to Hamidi's using the Intel e-mail
system." Thus, Intel could have proved a trespass by demonstrating that
Hamidi continued to send e-mails over the Intel network after Intel revoked
its implied consent.' Last, unlike trespass to chattels, Intel would not have
needed to demonstrate that Hamidi's e-mails have caused actual harm to Intel
or its computer network.' Thus, suing under a trespass to land theory would
more easily provide Intel, or a similar private network provider, with relief. 4
For the trespass to land analogy to be reasonable, the courts should limit
its applicability to cases in which the private network provider has expressly
revoked consent to access the private network." Connecting to the Internet
seems to indicate a willingness to engage in information exchange through e-
mail or through the Web.8 6 If courts were then to say.that any electronic
create true long-term employment opportunities at Intel"); see also Intel's Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 8, at 1 (explaining that FACE Intel maintains Web page and sends e-mails
to current Intel employees to spread its message).
278. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) TORTS § 167 (1965) (explaining thatpossessor can grant
consent to actor to enter land).
279. See id. § 171(b) (stating that if possessor revokes consent then actor will be liable for
any further or continuing entries to property).
280. See Ken Hamidi, FACE Intel (visited Mar. 7, 1999) <http'//www.faceintel.conl
intelvhamidi.htm> (explaining Hamidi's position with regard to lawsuit).
281. See Morrison Letter, supra note 219, at 1 (informing Hamidi that Hamidi was to cease
and desist from sending any more e-mails over Intel's network). There is little doubt that
Hamidi received notice that Intel was revoking its consent See Hamidi's Letter, supra note
220, at 1 (indicating that Hamidi had received letter informing him that Intel had revoked any
implied consent to use its network to e-mail its employees).
282. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 171(b) (1965) (stating that entries after revoca-
tion of consent will give rise to liability for trespass).
283. Compare id. § 218 cmt. e (stating that possessor must show actual harm in trespass
to chattels action) with id. § 158(a) (stating that actor may be liable for trespass even if actor
does not cause harm to land in trespass to land action).
284. See supra notes 228-37 and accompanying text (explaining Intel's difficulty with
showing harm); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 158(a) (1965) (stating that actor may
be liable for trespass, even absent showing of actual harm).
285. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 171(b) (1965) (permitting possessor to revoke
consent to enter land).
286. See supra Part IIA-C (discussing use of Internet, including e-mail and Web). Com-
puter networking developed with the intention of facilitating information exchange. See supra
notes 33-40 and accompanying text (explaining origins ofIntemet).
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signal, such as e-mail, could give rise to an action for trespass, the result
would be extreme: Every e-mail could subject an unwitting sender to liability
for trespass.' Furthermore, such potential liability would go against the
policy that the Supreme Court has set forth for judicial treatment of Internet
issues. 89 The Court has indicated that courts and legislatures should mini-
mize the constraints on Internet communication because of the Internet's
broad democratizing character." 9 Thus, to be consistent with this policy,
courts should limit the analogy between trespass to a network and trespass to
land so that liability will arise only if the network provider has expressly
revoked its consent.
Properly limited, the trespass to land analogy provides a logical means to
protect private network providers' interests. The law commonly understands
"property" to mean that bundle of legal rights, privileges, powers, and immu-
nities that a person claims to something as against other persons.2 ° Thus,
property is more than a physical, tangible object or plot of land; property is a
legally protectable interest.291 The constituent interests can and will alter as
new technologies arise.'8 As property notions change, courts already have
begun to include computer networks in the list of property interests that the
law should protect.' 3 The very nature of the common law allows for the
287. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 158 (1965) (subjecting trespasser to liability
whether or not trespass causes harm); id. § 167 (stating that possessor can consent to actor's
presence on land); id. § 171(b) (stating that if possessor revokes consent and actor has notice
of revocation, then actor will be liable in trespass for any firther entries to land).
288. See ACLU 11, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70 (1997) (expressing appreciation for full value of
Internet communications); see also supra Part ]ILA.2 (discussingACLUl).
289. See ACLU H, 521 U.S. at 868-70 (embracing Internet technology as having broad
democratic appeal and value); see also Kende, supra note 103, at 475 (commenting that
Supreme Court may regard Internet as positive social force).
290. See Wesley N. HorfeldSome FundamentalLegal Conceptions asApplied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 21-23 (1913) (discussing usage ofterm "property" and its meaning
as physical thing, but more accurately as rights of owner in relation to something).
291. See id. (demonstrating that property is more conceptual and incorporeal than it is
tangible thing).
292. See 1RICHARD R. POWErL, PoWE.L ONREALPROPERTY 13 (Patrick J. Rohan ed.,
1998) (stating that new property rights arise whenever new technology or social changes reveal
new scarcity). Powell gave several examples of creation of new property interests due to scarcity.
Id. One example is the regulation of broadcast media because oflimited frequencies for transmit-
ting broadcasts. Id. Another example is the regulation of air space because of the increase in air
traffic. Id.; see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,265 (1946) (finding that courts should
treat invasions of airspace as invasion of surface property). See generally Colin Cahoon,
Comment, LowAltitudeAirspace: APropertyRightsNo-Man'sLand, 56 J.AiRL. & CoM. 157
(1990) (discussing development of air-space property rights for land owners and discussing
danger that addressing every overflight as trespass would hamper growth of air industry).
293. See America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (E-D. Va. 1998) (granting
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courts to adapt the "old" law of trespass to new and developing technology. 2 4
Courts should now expand the protections provided for by trespass to land to
include trespasses to private networks.
V Conclusion
Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote: "To rest upon a formula is a slum-
ber that, prolonged, means death."295 To rest upon the notion that a private
network provider has an interest only in the chattel value of its network would
be a slumber that fails to appreciate the complexity of a private network
provider's interest in its network. This Note addressed the inapplicability of
the trespass to chattels theory to a situation in which a private network pro-
vider, an employer, wants to stop a flow of e-mails over its network." 6
A network provider's interest in assuring the viability of its network
extends beyond the network's mere fimctioning.' Although the trespass to
chattels theory might provide some recovery for non-physical injuries, it does
not permit the private network provider to protect itself from merely nominal
harm.' Furthermore, trespass to chattels does not allow the private network
provider to preempt actual harms that could arise from e-mail that comes from
outside parties. Thus, in order to protect the private network provider's very
real property interest in its network, the courts should allow a private network
provider to proceed on a limited trespass to land theory.'
injunction for trespass to chattels); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1015, 1030 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (same); see also supra notes 238.45 (explaining private network
provider's interest in network is broader than chattel interest); cf McOinnis, supra note 2, at
103-04 (suggesting that those who create discussion groups on Internet have ownership interest
in their created space). To support the suggestion that those creating discussion groups in
cyberspace own the discussion group space, one commentator observes that the creators have
the classic hallmark of ownership - the right to exclude others. Id.
294. See Rendleman, supra note 120, at 859 (stating that common law functions flexibly
to respond to new issues and disputes); see also MELVINARONEISNBERG, THENATURE OF THE
COMMON LAW 154-161 (1988) (proposing generative conception of common law). Under
Eisenberg's theory the common law "consists of the rules that would be generated at the present
moment by application of the institutional principles of adjudication." Id. at 154.
295. See OLVER WENDEILHOizA2Es, CO.LECTED LEGALPAPERS 306 (1920).
296. See supra Part V.B (discussing applicability of trespass to chattels to situations in
which private network providers seek to stop flow of c-mails to their networks).
297. See supra notes 248-55 (explaining property interest of private network provider).
298. See supra Part V.B (explaining limits of trespass to chattels theory for protecting
private network provider's interest).
299. See supra Part V.C (suggesting that analogizing to trespass to land would better
protect private network provider's interest).

